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 1 Introduction 
Hungary is the only country in the OSIS project, which represents the transitional countries, 
and the new members of the European Union. (Hungary joined the EU with nine other 
countries in 2004.) Homeownership has become a dominant tenure form all over the transition 
countries, and both the risk and security aspects of homeownership turn out to be relevant 
justifying the same approach applied in the project. However, there are several social 
problems which are related to the transition from a centrally planned economy to a democratic 
market society. This calls for an additional chapter providing the context for the Hungarian 
case among transitional countries. 
The first part of the study concludes that the restructuring process in the transition countries 
has common elements, thus the Hungarian case study will contribute to understanding some 
of the new features of the accession countries. A special emphasis was given to understanding 
the tenure forms, and the meaning of homeownership versus tenant position.  
The second part deals with the specific features of the restructuring process in the Hungarian 
housing system providing a background for the quantitative study on both the insecurity and 
the security elements of homeownership. This part of the study gives the framework of the 
quantitative analysis, which overlaps with the institutional study (belonging to the other 
Workpackage 2). The reason we put it in this study was that it seemed to be necessary to 
understand the related issues for the analysis of the micro data, and Hungary was not part of 
the HARE project, which preceded OSIS and published a book “as a state of art” . (Doling 
and Ford, 2003) 
The third part of the study focuses on the insecurity elements of homeownership. Firstly, we 
deal with the privatization process and try to understand the sociological motivation behind 
these processes, and evaluate some of the consequences. The main argument is that the 
“insecurity” of the tenant position was one of the most important individual motivations for 
the sitting tenants in buying their apartments. The other insecurity issue of housing (both for 
homeowners and tenants) has been the arrears issue. We analyze the data of national 
household surveys (1999, 2003) to describe the factors explaining the probability of arrears.  
In the conclusion we will reformulate some of the research questions the qualitative analysis 
has to answer. 
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 2 Homeownership in the transitional countries 
2.1 Towards new housing regimes 
2.1.1 East-European Housing Model: the legacy 
The main characteristics of the East-European Housing model (Hegedüs-Tosics, 1996) was 
the one-party political control over the housing sector, the subordinate role of market 
mechanisms, no market competition among housing agencies (bureaucratic coordination), and 
a broad control of the allocation of housing services (huge, non-transparent subsidies). 
However, under this model several “sub-models” (versions) emerged as responses of the 
individual countries to challenges in the process of the development of the socialist economy. 
(Turner et al, 1992) While the main characteristics of the model could be interpreted as a 
structural explanation, the divergences of the model were considered theoretically as “policy 
options” taken by the individual governments.1 The structural conflicts (“cracks”) were 
managed by different methods, introducing strict control mechanism (Bulgaria, Russia, East-
Germany), or allowing quasi market processes (Yugoslavia, Hungary). Differences of the 
models could be characterized by the tenure structure (state-owned rental, cooperative 
housing sector and owner occupation), the role of different financial and economic 
organizations, and by the significance of “self-help housing”. (Hegedüs, 1992) Differences 
were explained partly by exogenous factors, such as the organizational development of the 
party and the state, the economic and social policy, and partly by the endogenous 
development of the housing institutions. The outcomes of different policy options – even 
among countries with the same level of the GDP – were quite different in terms of the quality 
and quantity of housing. Despite all these, it is important to emphasize the common typically 
“East-European” elements of the different versions, e.g. the housing estates, the under-
maintained public sector, and rationed “elite” houses for the nomenclature, which justify the 
use of the term “East-European Housing Model”.   
2.1.2 Transition and welfare regimes 
The transition in 1989/1990 brought about the change of the political structure, introduction 
of the democratic political system2, which moved away the political constraints of the 
introduction of the market mechanism. A vast literature has been developed dealing with the 
transitional issues, which has been dominated by the liberal economic approach. 
The transitional paradigm (Mykhenko, 2004) is closely related to the classical liberal theory. 
The neo-classical tradition states that the introduction of the market institutions parallel with 
the introduction of political democracy and the downsizing of the role of the state lead to an 
efficient allocation of scare resources. However, there is a discussion about what the transition 
(the changes of system) from “socialism to capitalism” means. Kornai (1998, 2000) compares 
the models (“ideal types”) of the socialist and capitalist system. There is a discussion about 
                                                
1 This approach could be conceived as a “soft structuralist” approach, which combines a “rational choice” (policy choice or 
agency choice) type of explanation with structural elements. In my earlier work I followed this argumentation, for example, 
in the explanation of  “self-help” housing in Hungary. (Hegedüs, 1992)  
2 Democratic processes could be blocked, especially in the post-Soviet countries with ethnic conflicts. However, the political 
systems are under the pressure of the democratic principle (free election, freedom of speech etc.).  
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 when the transition process will be over. Kornai (2000) argued that there are three conditions 
to be fulfilled for transition to be considered as finished (1) the communist party has no 
monopoly of power; (2) the dominant part of the capital is in private ownership, (3) market 
coordination has become dominant. According to this definition, the transition has been over 
for several years (Svejnar, 2002). Gelb (1999) sees the end of the transition when the social 
and economic problems of transition countries are the same as those of the 
societies/economies at the same level of development. Svejnar (2002, p. 26) defined the “end 
of transition as a state when these economies replace central planning by a functioning market 
system and when they generate rapid and sustainable rates of economic growth that enable 
them to interact with the more advanced market economies without major form of 
protection.” In our approach, which is closer to Gelb’s, transition means specific social issues 
related to the institutional changes of the economy. Obviously, this is quite a vague definition, 
as in countries of transition both types of social problems arise, the problems, which are 
related to the structural adjustment of the organizations and households, and problems of the 
modern societies. 
Different manifestations of the capitalist system (Kornai, 2000) lead to different institutional 
models. The convergence theory answers this question by stating that the differences among 
different versions are not relevant or exist only temporarily; in the long run the differences 
will become irrelevant or will disappear. The divergence theory emphasizes the differences, 
and tries to define the main characteristics of the different models. The various regime 
theories try to explain the differences in the models focusing on the different spheres of the 
society. The critics of the welfare regime theory (Voorhois, 2002) argue that because of 
inadequate empirical validation, the regime theory has only heuristic value “as a way of 
thinking” about the welfare systems. However, what is true for the welfare regime, is not 
necessarily true for other sectors. The famous Esping-Andersen (1990) typology differentiates 
among the liberal, conservative and corporative regimes analyzing the different welfare 
systems.  
2.1.3 Different housing regimes in transition 
The shift toward the market based housing system3 took place in different ways at different 
“speed”, and thus resulted in different sub-models. The differences can be explained partly by 
the exogenous factor, like the strength of the democratic institutions, the structural changes 
etc., and also by the endogenous factor, i.e. the institutional and legal legacy of the socialist 
housing system. The challenges the national governments had to respond to had a lot of 
common elements. Theoretically there were two basic options after the transition: 1. to use the 
housing sector as an “engine” of the change ; or 2. to use as it as “shock absorption” (Struyk, 
1996). The first option was practically unfeasible, because in the time of the economic decline 
the under-maintained and under-financed housing sector cannot be totally “marketed” without 
huge and unmanageable social conflicts.  
                                                
3 Buckley and Tsenkova, (2003, p 19) characterized the market based housing system as one in which the market 
mechanisms dominate the production, allocation and consumption of housing, there is sufficient competition among agents 
and institutions in the interrelated markets for housing finance, resources and services, and governments provide subsidies 
that are relatively transparent, progressively targeted and budgeted in sustainable ways. 
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 Even countries having relatively successful transition strategies (Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Poland) postponed the structural changes in the public service sector like health, education, 
and the social sector4, and focused on the production and financial sector. Housing was in-
between, because in certain housing areas there were no basic social barriers to major changes 
(construction industry, building material), but in the area of housing services (water, heating, 
etc.) it was not possible to introduce market mechanisms (price liberalization, enforcement) 
because of the risk of social conflicts. Housing privatization, one of the favourite topics of 
housing discussion, should be conceived in this framework. The decisions on privatization 
were not based on the “policy choice” of having the “unitary” or the “dual” model5, but were 
more the results of short-term political interests. The real and tough question was (Hegedüs 
and Tosics,1996b) not the tenure structure, but the “operation” of the housing sector. Private 
does not necessarily mean market, and the key question is how market mechanism is 
introduced as a dominant integrating mechanism. The key question in terms of the future 
direction of the housing models of transition countries is not whether the country has brought 
about a “fast” or “slow” privatization, but whether it has introduced a change in the property 
management. The difference between the Bulgarian and Czech “model” does not lie in the 
privatization, but more in how much role the market mechanisms play in the property 
management, as Bulgaria did not have a public stock to privatize. In this sense “fast” 
privatization and “slow” privatization did not represent different models in themselves.6  
The future model of the housing systems of the transitional countries depends on the policy 
and institutional options chosen under structural constraints (fiscal pressure, new political 
system, privatised economy, public sector reformed etc.)  The emphases are on both policy 
and institutional elements of the housing system. It is not enough to deal with policy choices7 
without real institutional background. The task of the research is to find the factors which 
influence these policy and institutional decisions. A good comparative research first has to 
understand the real role of the different institutional solutions in a particular housing system, 
and on the basis of this has to look for the answers why different countries have chosen 
different options.  
2.2 Tenure structure and housing privatisation 
2.2.1 Tenure structure before transition 
In the socialist housing system four main types of tenure could be differentiated. It was not 
only the “meaning” of tenure that was not the same in the different countries, but it was 
changing in time, too. This is the reason why it is not easy to give an overview of the tenure 
structure before the transition.  
                                                
4 While structural changes were postponed in the social service sector, new elements emerged partly related to the housing 
sector.  
5 Kemeny’s two models (Kemeny, 1995) are frequently used as real policy options. 
6 This problem can be illustrated with the excellent book edited by M. Lux (2003), which had to introduce Bulgaria as a 
separate model. This raises concerns about the explanatory value of this theory. 
7 The policy options embedded in government papers and government decrees are not sufficient conditions to bring about 
real changes in the housing system. Without institutional support (banks, local governments, building companies) these 
attempts will not be successful. Thus the analysis of the housing policies without their institutional background can only give 
limited insight into the process of transition.  
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 2.2.1.1 Public rental 
“Public rental” is a comprehensive title that includes both municipal rental housing and 
enterprise housing leased to workers. Directly or indirectly, the state paid for the construction 
and maintenance of both types. The two systems of developing, maintaining, and allocating 
housing existed side-by-side, which also caused political tension between the territorial and the 
sectoral principle in the development policy. Enterprise housing was very important in the 
Soviet Union, but even in Poland it was 13 %, in Slovakia 6 % of the stock (Hajduk, 1996). 
The privatization of enterprise housing became complicated because privatization of the 
companies had preceded the privatization of the housing stock.   
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Figure 1 The share of public rental as a percentage of the total stock, in 1990 and in 
2000.8
The state housing in ex-Yugoslavia (so called “socially owned housing”) represented a special 
case. The production of socially owned housing was financed by enterprises and 
municipalities. In Yugoslavia, since the 1960s, construction of multi-family housing was 
usually organized and carried out by a public enterprise operating under the authority of the 
municipal governments. A tender would be issued to which various enterprises or 
municipalities could respond by contracting for purchase of the number of units they could 
afford and needed for their employees. Construction costs were paid in advance, and could be 
increased during the construction period to keep up with inflation. After completion of the 
building, occupancy or tenure rights were assigned to families. Enterprises or municipalities 
who paid for construction of the building remained the owners. There were no direct central or 
local government subsidies for construction or management of housing. Enterprises funded 
construction of housing for their employees from their own income or profits. A central Housing 
Solidarity Fund was used to finance construction of apartments for persons who had no other 
access to housing, or for employees of enterprises in "non-productive" sectors (government, 
education, research) or enterprises with insufficient income to house their employees. The 
Housing Solidarity Fund was made up of payroll deductions of 6 percent from all enterprise 
employees. 
                                                
8 Source of data: Lux (2003), ECE(2002), MRI  (1996) 
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 Working hostels had important role in the EEHM. They were controlled by the big state owned 
companies providing shelters basically to the first generation industrial workers migrating from 
the rural areas. It can be considered as a special type of enterprise housing. After the transition, 
workers’ hostels disappear from the market. 
2.2.1.2 Co-operative 
Co-operative housing, while heavily subsidized, generally required significant contributions 
from purchasers. This type of housing occupies a medial group between owning and renting, 
because in Eastern Europe there was only a slight difference between living in a co-operative 
and a state rental. Co-operative “owners” had quite limited property rights, including restricted 
rights of disposition. “Individually owned” units were almost exclusively single-family units in 
smaller cities, towns, and rural areas. 
The diversity in the importance of state housing versus owner-occupation and co-operative 
tenure resulted from conscious government policies. In all socialist countries the government 
had the responsibility by constitution to provide for adequate housing for citizens. In the1960s, 
co-operative housing was introduced in the Soviet Union, and later in other socialist countries.  
Development of co-operatives became a very important element in the housing strategies in the 
East European countries, and this is reflected in the comparatively large share of units in this 
legal form. Especially Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia had a larger cooperative sector 
around 20-22% of the stock.  
Interestingly enough, it plays very different roles depending on the individual political factors. 
It is important to emphasize that this type of housing was not so much different from the state 
public housing, as the construction, allocation, and financing were organized by the 
organizations under direct state control. However, differentiation between tenants' and owners' 
co-operatives form did not essentially play any role as for the property rights. Co-operative 
members, being owners of their co-operative flats, enjoyed the privileges of owners of real 
estate, with some limitations. They could sell their flats independently, the co-operative being 
obliged to admit the buyer to co-operative membership. These flats can also be inherited. 
Building co-operatives (which are not tenure) played some role in Bulgaria, and ex-
Yugoslavian countries. 
2.2.1.3 Private ownership 
Private/individual ownership was typical for the rural areas and outer areas of the cities in the 
region. Private ownership, in principle, means full right of use, disposing, management and 
possession of the real estate, referring mainly to the stock of family houses, mostly with one 
flat, to smaller and less attractive houses, in particular regarding the housing stock built before 
the nationalization process.  
In practice, several constraints were imposed on private ownership. For instance, private 
ownership over flats was taken away from the owners during the socialist period, where the 
tenants with tenant’s rights enjoyed the right of possession and management in the sense of 
investing in improvement of housing quality; such flats were then run by the public housing 
funds, and the owners were responsible for maintenance of the common parts of the building 
and of the walls. 
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 2.2.1.4 Private rental 
Private rental was a part of the “gray” economy, because even in the rental sector the sitting 
tenants had rights to sublet their apartments, but in most of the countries this tenure was not 
reported. In some of the countries in the region the share of second homes is extremely high, 
e.g. in Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. With the development of tourism second 
homes have become important economic assets. 
The tenure structure by itself does not say too much about the operation of the sector, as the 
detailed regulation and unwritten rules made significant modification on the effect of the tenure 
form (Hegedüs-Tosics,1996) For example, in Bulgaria, property rights tied to private 
(individual) ownership were controlled by several rules, e.g. limitation on selling. In co-
operative housing the “members” of the co-operation were not free to choose the maintenance 
companies, the fees were set by law, etc. Thus, it is very important to note that tenure itself was 
defined by a wide range of detailed regulations.   
The countries in East-Europe demonstrate an enormous diversity in tenure patterns before the 
transition. On average, around 20 % of the stock belonged to the public sector according to our 
terminology. On the one hand, one extreme was Albania with 35 % of public stock, and the 
other Bulgaria with 7 %; the other countries have 15-25 % of the stock in public hands. The 
extraordinarily high homeownership rates in Bulgaria before the transition are striking, but if 
we understand the actual operation of the housing sector, this fact did not make much 
difference in terms of the processes in the sector. The other difference was the role of the 
cooperative sector. In the pre-transition period it was just another form of state controlled 
housing, as the cooperative “movements” were under the supervision of the state apparatus. 
However, after the transition these differences have become important.  
2.2.2 Privatization and restitution 
Privatisation and restitution were important factors influencing the problems of the housing 
asset management. The restitution (when former owners of property reclaim assets that were 
expropriated from them or which their families had been forced to sell) played an important 
role only in the Czech Republic9, but it was possible in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania as well. Except for the Czech Republic, restitution has not created a substantial 
“sub-market”, but it could have a huge influence on the operation of the sector through the 
uncertainty of the property rights.  
Restitution caused several social tensions because the position of the sitting tenants had 
become uncertain. In some countries the governments obliged themselves by law to provide 
housing for these tenants, but the process was full of conflicts (Albania, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, etc.). For example, in Croatia, tenants living in units owned by other physical 
persons have a “protected tenants” right. In the Czech Republic the regulation of the private 
rental sector has become one of the most discussed housing policy issues.  
                                                
9 In the Czech Republic the restitution led to a quite substantial regulated private rental sector. By the end of 1993 the process 
had finished, and only a small number of cases were waiting for court solution. (Sykora, 1996)  
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 In Romania, the law made the restitution possible, but it had not been enforced because of the 
“opposition” of the sitting tenants. As Dawidson (2003) showed, in Timisoara (Temesvár) – 
county seat of Timiş (Temes) --  “although the restitution law gave people, who lost private 
property due to Communist confiscations, the right to reclaim their property, it also entitled 
sitting tenants to buy the dwellings they occupied. Hence, private property rights have become 
distorted due to vague delimitations between the ownership rights of former owners and 
tenants, in the most urbanised areas in particular”.  
The privatisation in the region followed different methods. In Hungary, a right to buy 
legislation was introduced, while in the Czech Republic no central regulation was applied. As 
a consequence, privatization is much slower in the Czech Republic. Some of the observers 
concluded that the Czech Republic followed another model, namely it tried to keep the 
universalist model. However, without structural changes in the sector (rent regulation, rent 
allowance, allocation procedures, and transparent landover-tenant relation) we cannot talk 
about a new model.10 In Albania, for example, 90 % of the sector was “transferred” to the 
sitting tenants by the force of law without any legal, administrative and financial grounding. 
The privatisation in Serbia had the same problem; at the beginning of the 90s, the majority of 
the socially owned stock was privatised at 10 % of the market price without the establishment 
of the organisational conditions of the maintenance and management of the stock. (Habitat, 
Serbia, 2000). In Croatia, the laws related to privatisation tried to provide the necessary 
environment for the operation of the privatised stock. Although the process of privatisation 
has not yet been finished, the countries in the region put more and more effort into the 
consolidation of the management problems of this stock. 
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Figure 2 Share of the owner-occupied dwelling 2002 11  
We should emphasize that beyond the privatisation of the public dwellings, there are different 
other forms to be considered. The privatisation of construction and maintenance enterprises 
has an important effect not only on the maintenance and renewal of the privatised stock but on 
the urban multi-family housing stock as a whole. 
                                                
10 Till now the tenants can sell their right to the tenancy in the Czech Republic, which means the lack of real changes. (Lux. 
2004) 
11 Source of data: Lux (2003), ECE (2002), MRI  (1996) 
 13
 Housing privatisation has generated an enormous public debate both in the national and 
international literature. In the evaluation of the debate it is important to realize that in the 
socialist public sector the tenants enjoyed a wide range of property rights, which made it 
impossible to have an efficient social rental sector.  
Privatisation made the property rights transparent, and, of course, put the burden of the 
operational and maintenance cost on the new owners, who were not prepared for it either from 
the financial, or the management point of view. These “forced owners” today have to face the 
fact that the maintenance of their ownership has to be financed from own resources. Actually, 
the state made available the ownership through cheap prices and low rate loans and gave over 
all other financial and managing responsibilities to the new owners.  
The housing policy after privatisation faced a huge affordability problem. The prices of the 
housing related services (maintenance, water, sewage, garbage collection, district heating, 
energy etc.) have increased in the time of economic decline. The crucial problem was that the 
housing structure (multi-unit building, no metering for public services) did not make it 
possible for the individual household to adjust its consumption to the changed economic 
conditions. The households’ real income decreased as a consequence of the economic collapse 
after the transition and the war, and the housing structure was unable to allow for the 
individual modification of the consumption. Any modification was in itself pointless without 
proper insulation and individual metering.  
It was not that poor families had been over-represented in the multi-family housing stock, but 
gradually the social composition of the stock worsened as the better off families moved out 
from this part of the housing sector with declining value. Generally, but especially in terms of 
the multi-family housing stock, it was difficult for the politicians to let free market regulations 
(e.g. demand-supply driven prices of communal services and rents, efficient legal sanctions 
against families in arrears) prevail in the housing sector, as this would lead to the collapse of a 
significant part of the owner occupied sector. Similarly, financial institutions are very 
cautious with the owners and do not rush to introduce real mortgage lending in the post-
socialist countries. Even if it is by now easy in most countries to verify the market value of an 
owner occupied unit, many owners have low incomes to repay a mortgage loan and legal 
sanctions against non-payers, i.e. the legal protection of the borrowers is still weak.  
The key question is what happened to the traditional state maintenance companies, which had 
the task to manage the multi-family building stock both public and in private. In some 
countries they were municipalized (transferred to the municipalities), divided into smaller 
units, privatised, or restructured in other ways. The restructuring process in the management 
has been much slower than in the ownership structure because this includes changes in a 
variety of sectors of the economy like company laws, construction industry, etc. 
2.2.3 Legal issues of the housing security 
The legal meaning of tenure has gone through a changing process in transition countries. 
Marcuse (1996) argued that private ownership in the EEHM did not serve as an capital 
accumulation, as housing was more a “consumer” good, than a capital “good”. In our 
approach, housing could not serve as a capital accumulation because of the political control, 
and not because of the socialist nature of ownership. It is important to realize, that as far as 
market transactions existed, the capital accumulation through home-ownership was possible.  
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 However, the home-ownership existed under political control (for example the number of 
properties was maximized).   After the transition these controls were lifted.  
The introduction of the new legal framework is crucial, but without an efficient enforcement 
system its effects are questionable. To introduce legal regulations which cannot be enforced 
could distort the existing legal system as well. It turned out that building up efficient 
enforcement procedures is more difficult than the creation of the new laws. In the case of 
multi-unit buildings there is a need for a legal form defining the relation of the individual 
owners to and among one another. There are two basic legal types of multi-unit buildings: 
condominiums and co-operatives. In some countries (e.g. in Albania, Moldavia, etc.) there 
was a legal gap after the privatisation, because no laws regulated the relation among the 
different owners in the same building. 
In the case of condominiums the absolute ownership of a unit is based on a legal description of 
the airspace the unit actually occupies, plus an undivided interest in the ownership of the 
common elements, which are owned jointly with the other condominium unit owners. The 
owner is entitled to a single unit, as well as a share in the common elements such as elevators 
or surrounding land. A condominium is a form of homeownership that combines individual 
ownership of one's unit with shared ownership of common facilities. Each owner may have a 
separate mortgage for his or her individual unit and is individually responsible for making the 
payments and real estate taxes on it.  
Housing co-operative means joint corporate ownership of a housing development made by 
those who reside on the premises. It could be any type of organization that is owned and 
controlled by its member-users for a common purpose and that follows the co-operative 
principles. A co-operative operates for the benefit of its members on a not-for-profit basis in 
order to provide the goods and services members need at the lowest practical cost. 
Members/shareholders own the co-operative and participate equally in the governance of the 
co-operative.  
There are different types of co-operatives depending on the specific regulations with respect to 
the owners’ rights and responsibilities. In a tenant housing co-operative, there are two owners, 
the co-operative corporation and the corporation's owners, who are typically known as tenant-
stockholders. The co-operative corporation owns or leases the housing project, including all 
land, dwelling units and common areas. Its tenant-stockholders, who by virtue of their stock 
ownership, are entitled to occupy a specific dwelling unit, in turn, jointly own the co-operative 
corporation. Tenant-stockholders purchase stock — sometimes called shares or membership 
certificates — in the co-operative corporation. Upon purchasing stock in the co-operative, the 
tenant-stockholder signs a perpetual lease, called a proprietary lease or occupancy agreement 
that gives the tenant-stockholder a legal and exclusive right to occupy a dwelling unit as long 
as all obligations to the co-operative are met. Tenant housing co-operatives were rare in the 
region, typically building co-operatives were set up just for the construction period.  
Both condominiums and housing co-operatives have to set up an organisational framework to 
manage their responsibilities, to meet financial obligations, to initiate contracts, to manage 
maintenance and renewal, etc. The organisation passes on the related costs to the individual 
owners, who pay a single monthly fee or charge to the organisation. One of the questions is the 
legal status of the organisation. The condominiums are typically not legal persons, thus, behind 
every contract there are individual owners. Typically, the law defines the “home owner 
association” as a decision-making body with public meetings and voting procedures, with a 
common budget and business plans.  
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 The Homeowners’ Associations’ or the Housing Council’s own internal decision-making 
structure is set up in the relevant Condominium Law. This law regularly differentiates between 
decisions with low cost consequence and decisions on higher investments, such as renovation 
or requiring further or higher contribution from the associated owners. The first requires 
normally a simple majority of votes, the latter a higher share according to the owners’ 
ownership rate (e.g. 67 % in Romania). In case the HoA’s have the right to sue the associated 
owners for non-payments; they possess a tool to enforce the decisions. In cases when they do 
not, there is no actual possibility to control the common decisions’ implementation.  
In most countries, land registries are regarded as reliable repositories of records on ownership 
rights and interests in real property. In the socialist period, land registration was a neglected 
area, even in countries that in the pre-Second World War period had introduced quite an 
efficient land registration system at the time.  
The typical problem is the slow administration and unreliable records, despite the fact that each 
country has recently adopted laws and made great efforts to modernise the system including 
computerization. Efforts are now underway to amend the controlling law and introduce the 
position of registration clerks. In ex-Yugoslavia and Albania the share of illegal construction is 
very high, which causes a lot of problems to reach an acceptable level of the quality of land 
registration.  
Courts or Land Offices could administer registration, with filings handled by judges or 
administrative personnel. Ownership is not transferred until registration is complete, which 
may take several months. A good titling system would seem important to enforce the payment 
for the service fees. Banks making loans for purchase of property encounter risks during the 
period when the borrowers do not have defined property titles.  
The building law has an important effect on the housing management. Every observer in the 
region concludes that the deterioration process of the multi-family housing stock has reached a 
critical stage when even the life-hazard issue can be raised in respect of the condition of this 
stock. In principle, the building law should prescribe the basic standards for the housing 
structures. In the case of the houses that do not meet the requirements, a fine has to be imposed 
or a compulsory reconstruction process should be initiated.  
The new housing (rental) law has become necessary after the transition, especially in 
countries where new type of rental stock was introduced. In Poland, the TBS (non-profit 
rental sector), in Czech Republic the restituted private rental, and in other countries the central 
government supported rental stock (Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic) were regulated.  
(Hegedüs, 2004) 
The other key area of the regulation is the foreclosure law and eviction. There is ambiguity 
related to the security of home-ownership in the case of arrears (mortgage, rent or utility). As 
the housing cost increased in the transition countries, the social problem of arrears became 
important.  
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 2.3 Emerging housing finance in the transition countries 
After the transition – in contrast to the expectations – housing demand has decreased as a 
consequence of the macroeconomic decline. Unemployment, inflation, and the decrease of 
real incomes in combination with the withdrawal of the housing subsidies led to the decline of 
the housing output. Housing construction declined in each country in the 90s, independently 
of how successful the economic and social transition was. Figure 3 shows that compared to 
the output in 1990, the decline reached 80-65 % in countries in transition.   
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Figure 3 Decline of the housing output between 1990 and 2000 (Source: MRI) 
The recovery of the housing systems depends on the new housing finance system. In the 90s 
the most successful transitional countries restructured and privatized their banking system, 
and tried to introduce a mortgage finance system. Despite the different institutional solutions, 
mortgage finance lending started at the beginning of 2000 as a consequence of the 
stabilization, low inflation, and low interest rate.  
 
 17
 0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
2000 2001 2002 2003
Romania
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Hungary
 
Figure 4 Outstanding loan as a % of the GDP (Source: MRI) 
Typically the outstanding loans are at 1-3 % of the GDP, which shows that mortgage finance 
is in its early stage. Hungary – as we will show – introduced a very costly mortgage subsidy 
program and increased the outstanding mortgage substantially. However, there are signs of 
the fast progress in mortgage finance even in countries where the mortgage subsidy is not 
extremely high, like Poland and the Czech Republic. (See Figure 4) 
The new element in these countries is the significance of the foreign currency (typically Swiss 
Frank or Japanese Yen) based mortgage, where the borrowers bear the exchange rate risk. In 
Poland the share of denominated loans has been above 50 %, and in Hungary, after 
downsizing the mortgage subsidies, the foreign currency based loans have increased to a great 
extent. The significance of the mortgage finance increases the risk of homeownership, but we 
are still in an initial stage to be able to evaluate its social significance.  
2.4 Risk and security elements of the tenure structure in transitional 
countries 
In this chapter we argued that countries in transition have common elements in the process of 
restructuring, which justify a special approach to their problems. One of the elements is the 
change in the tenure structure. Though in countries belonging to the East European Housing 
model there were quite different tenure structures, the operational logic of the model (the 
“structure”) was basically the same: dominance of the state institutions. Thus in 1990, at the 
turn of the transition, the tenure structure in Eastern Europe showed a “wide variety”. After 
the transition two things happened: 1. Privatisation process started 2. the “reinterpretation” of 
tenure started. The first element is quite transparent, and the process could be described and 
analysed; however, the second element is less obvious. Our argument is that tenure rights in a 
wider sense (property rights, real estate registration, foreclosure law etc.) went through (and 
they still are) under a reinterpretation process, which has an enormous significance from the 
point of view of our project. The security and risk elements of homeownership are closely 
related to these, not merely legal, processes.  
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 The second common element is the lack of “social housing” not only in the sense of the public 
ownership, but in the operational sense, that is, housing for people who are facing huge 
affordability problems. The institutional solutions are under “construction”, and we can talk 
about different attempts (e.g. the Polish TBS, or the municipal housing in other countries) 
which point into that direction.  It is not easy to evaluate these programs from the point of 
view of political and financial sustainability. In Hungary, for example, the new rental housing 
program started in 2000 was stopped owing to financial reasons.   
The third common element related to the risk and security of homeownership is the 
consequence of the hardship paying the increased housing related costs in a “constrained” 
macroeconomic environment. That is, a relatively wide share of the households is facing the 
problems of arrears, a huge social and political issue which has to be managed by the 
transitional countries. This is what we can call structural adjustment: households have to 
adjust their consumption according to their budget constrains, the increased burden has to be 
shared in multi-unit building among the tenants and owners, an efficient safety net has to be 
introduced to help households to manage hardship, the efficiency of the services has to be 
increased, and a new legal environment of the service sector has to be introduced (consumer 
protection, etc.). 
The fourth common element is the introduction of the new housing finance system. In the 90s, 
independently of how successful the transition was in a political and macroeconomic sense, 
the housing sector in terms of the new construction and housing finance got into a deep crisis. 
Actually, the housing output decreased to 30-60 % of the 90s’ level, and housing finance 
actually disappeared. At the beginning of the 2000s, the housing output gradually started to 
increase and new, market oriented hosing finance institutions have emerged and housing 
finance has started to increase slowly (or in some countries, like in Hungary, at a faster pace). 
This increase raises the problem of risk, which in nature is not different from the problems in 
the more developed market societies, but because its close relation to other transitional 
problems we have to study it carefully in the context of other transitional problems. 
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 3 Hungary: The social and economic changes of the housing 
system (institutional study)  
3.1 Macro-economic changes: employment, etc. 
3.1.1 Economic restructuring (privatization, unemployment) 
With the transition, the macro-economic situation in Hungary experienced large imbalances. 
The restructuring of the political structure brought about changes in the economy, the sectors’ 
setup, ownership forms, labour market and social policy as well. With the abolishment of 
central planning in the economy, processes of the market economy had gained space. This 
went in line with the decrease of the GDP in the first five years, which was then followed by a 
slow recovery. 
Changes in the labour market due to closing down of many previously state owned 
companies, and restructuring of the production sector, caused the employment ratio to 
decrease. The decline mostly affected the North-Eastern region of Hungary and those 
settlements where heavy industry had dominated. The regional differences between the 
eastern and western parts of the country are still pertinent, whereas investments and 
developments slowly stream also to more underdeveloped areas.  
Table 1 Changes in employment (1980-2001) 
Year GDP EmploymentDependency rate 
In 
thousands
Empl. 
ratio 
1980   0,58 5458,2 65,3 
1989 100,7 98,2 -   
1990 96,5 97,2 0,51 4880,0 59,0 
1991 88,1 92,6 0,50 4520,0 54,4 
1992 96,9 90,3 0,49 4082,7 49,0 
1993 99,4 93,8 0,49 3827,0 45,8 
1994 102,9 98,0 0,48 3751,5 44,8 
1995 101,5 98,1 0,48 3678,8 43,9 
1996 101,3 99,1 0,48 3648,2 43,6 
1997 104,6 100,1 0,47 3646,4 43,6 
1998 104,9 101,4 0,47 3697,8 44,3 
1999 104,2 103,2 0,47 3811,4 45,7 
2000 105,2 101,0 0,47 3849,1 46,2 
2001 103,8 100,3 0,46 3859,5 45,4 
2002 103,3 100,1 0,46 3883,7 45,6 
Source: The Hungarian Labor Market (Review and analyses) ed. by K. Fazekas; J. Koltay; ZS. Cseres-Gergely, 
Institute of Economics, 2004 
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 Although the nominal income steadily increased throughout the last decade, it could not keep 
pace with the high inflation of the first half of the nineties. Hence, the real income 
considerably decreased. The incomes had only recovered by the end of the nineties when the 
effects of stabilizing interventions had become felt. This could only go along with the rapid 
economical growth the country experienced, ranging from 3,5 to 5,2 % GDP growth per year 
from 1997-2001, compared to less than 1,0 % in much of Western Europe.  
Table 2 Changes in earnings (1989-2001) 
Year Consumer price index 
Gross earnings, 
HUF 
Net earnings, 
HUF 
Monthly average, 
HUF 
Average 
gross 
earnings 
1980     =100 
1989 117,0 10 571 8 165   
1990 128,9 13 446 10 108   
1991 135,0 17 934 12 948   
1992 123,0 22 294 15 628 8 000 36 
1993 122,5 27 173 18 397 9 000 33 
1994 118,8 33 939 23 424 10 500 31 
1995 128,2 38 900 25 891 12 200 31 
1996 123,6 46 837 30 544 14 500 31 
1997 118,3 57 270 38 145 17 000 30 
1998 114,3 67 764 45 162 19 500 29 
1999 110,0 77 187 50 076 22 500 29 
2000 109,8 87 645 55 785 25 500 29 
2001 109,2 103 558 64 915 40 000 39 
2002 105,2 122 453 77 607 50 000 41 
Source: The Hungarian Labor Market (Review and analyses) ed. By K. Fazekas; J. Koltay; ZS. Cseres-Gergely, Institute of 
Economics, 2004 
The adjustments to the new economic situation not only concerned the producing sector, but 
also the legal forms of economic activity as a whole. The withdrawal of the state and the 
privatization process launched the forming of numerous enterprises. The economic climate 
turned out to be prosperous for establishing smaller (family based) enterprises. Nevertheless, 
it has to be remarked that in some cases the formation of such small companies meant actually 
a strategy of assuring alternative income possibilities to those offered in the uneasily 
accessible job market. The growth of the tertiary sector also contributed to this phenomenon. 
The result was a change of the employment structure, where the self-employment spread and 
got stabilized around 10 %, whereas membership in cooperatives practically disappeared and 
employment in other partnerships diminished. 
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 Table 3 Employed by type of employment - in thousands 
 Employees Member of cooperative 
Member of 
other 
partnership 
Self employed 
and assisting 
family member 
Total 
1992 3 203,4 225,0 257,9 339,4 4 025,7 
1993 3 087,6 134,1 197,1 351,5 3 770,3 
1994 3 045,2 103,3 174,7 369,3 3 692,5 
1995 2 978,9 84,2 167,9 391,8 3 622,8 
1996 2 961,2 79,0 151,8 413,1 3 605,1 
1997 2 989,7 68,9 137,4 414,3 3 610,3 
1998 3 088,5 55,8 132,5 397,9 3 674,7 
1999 3 201,3 42,5 111,8 435,9 3 791,5 
2000 3 255,5 37,1 129,4 407,1 3 829,1 
2001 3 296,3 30,7 119,1 398,4 3 844,5 
2001 3 313,6 31,4 118,9 404,4 3 868,3 
2002 3 337,2 22,5 109,9 401,0 3 870,6 
Source: The Hungarian Labor Market (Review and analyses) ed. by K. Fazekas; J. Koltay; ZS. Cseres-Gergely, Institute of 
Economics, 2004 
The regional differences that emerged during the transition times were amplified with the 
heavy income stratification process of the society, which resulted in large differences among 
the income groups. The poorest group’s (the lowest decile) relative position to the median 
income level weakened, the distance between the income of the lowest and the fifth decile 
grew to 2 by 2001, whereas the highest decile’s rose to 3,7 fold by the beginning of the 21st 
century. The latter group earned twofold the median income in Hungary in 2001. Between 
1996 and 2001 the income differences decreased a little, nevertheless the risk of poverty is 
still high. 
The indicators below show that the lowest deciles earn 3,2 % of all households’ income, the 
middle level (fifth and sixth deciles) 17,5 %, and the best positioned group 24,3 %. The 
remoteness among the groups below and above the average income grew considerably, and 
the Gini coefficient’s value also draws the attention to the heightening of inequalities during 
the last decades. 
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 Table 4 The inequality if individuals' per capita household income - selected indicators12 
 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1996 2001
P10 - 57 56 61 62 61 60 48 50
P90 175 165 165 161 162 173 183 191 184
P50/P10 - 1,8 1,8 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 2,1 2,0
P90/P50 1,8 1,6 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,9 1,8
P90/P10 - 2,89 2,94 2,65 2,61 2,81 3,07 3,95 3,70
S1 3,6 4,1 4,0 4,5 4,9 4,5 3,8 3,2 3,2
S5+S6 18,0 18,7 18,6 18,7 18,6 17,9 17,4 17,5 17,5
S10 20,8 19,1 19,7 18,6 18,6 20,9 22,7 24,3 24,3
S10/S1 5,8 4,7 4,9 4,1 3,8 4,6 6,0 7,5 7,7
Robin Hood 18,5 16,0 17,6 15,0 14,9 17,0 18,5 20,7 20,9
Éltető Frigyes 2,09 1,92 1,96 1,84 1,82 2,00 2,13 2,32 2,34
Gini 0,257 0,227 0,236 0,214 0,209 0,244 0,266 0,300 0,304
Sources: The Hungarian Labor Market (Review and analyses) ed. by K. Fazekas; J. Koltay; ZS. Cseres-Gergely, Institute of 
Economics, 2004 
 
3.1.2 Decentralization (role of local governments) 
The former council system prior to 1990 represented a deconcentration of the state 
administration on three levels. The local level’s executive competencies were given to local 
agents of the current territorial units. Settlements were amalgamated into app. 1,300 councils. 
The county level – the middle tier – was a powerful level since it was represented in the 
central government’s planning committees and the counties had the authorization to distribute 
the revenues of and to the local councils. (Teller 2003) The decentralization created a 
fragmented system of local governance (10 million people and 3,200 municipalities) 
(Hegedüs, 2003). Local governments enjoy a wide responsibility in the area of housing 
services (planning, enforcement of building regulations, local public rental sector, utility 
companies, price setting etc.). The energy sector (electricity and gas services) remained under 
the central government’s control, while other public services such as water and sewage, 
garbage collection, district heating, rents, etc., thus, most of the housing service provision, 
became the responsibility of the local governments.13  
                                                
12 Notes: The measures are based on the variation of per capita household income of individuals. 
P10: Upper break point of the lowest decile, per cent of the median. P90: lower break point of the highest decile, per cent of 
the median. S1, S10: Income of the lowest/highest decile, per cent of the population's total income. Robin Hood index: 
Income to be transferred from high-income to low-income deciles in order to archive perfect equality, per cent of the 
population's total income. High income: decile with a share higher than 1/10. Éltető-Frigyes index: Ratio of incomes above 
the average to incomes lower than the average. Gini coefficient: Index of concentration ranging from 0 (all incomes are 
equal) to 1 (all incomes owned by a single person). 
13 Control meant the right of price regulation, the ownership of the service companies and the right to privatize the services. 
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 As a response to these challenges, the safety net has gone through a major transformation 
after the regime change. Welfare programs have two lines of operation: partly through the 
programs defined by the central government (parliament), and partly through local 
government managed (mixed financed) programs. The housing allowance system introduced 
in 1993 remained a “low budget” program, consequently, utility and rent arrears increased in 
the 90s. According to the household survey, in 1992 11,7 % of the households indicated that 
they had real difficulty paying the utility cost and rents. By 1997 their share increased to 15.4 
%. (HHP, 1998). Housing surveys of 1999 and 2003 indicated that 6-7 % of the households 
had arrears (CSO, 2004); but other sources estimated a larger portion of households with 
arrears problem. Realizing the significance of the social problems related to arrears, from 
1997 the government started launching programs to give incentives to local governments to 
manage the arrears issue. However, no substantial results were accomplished, and in 2003, a 
new housing allowance scheme was elaborated and an arrears management program was 
introduced. (Hegedüs-Teller, 2004) 
As a result of the give-away privatization, the public rental sector decreased from 20 % 
(1989) to 4 % (2003), however, because of the residualization, the households “trapped” in 
the public sector were typically the neediest ones. At the same time, local governments 
realized the necessity to increase rent to improve cost recovery in the rental sector. In order to 
make rent increase possible, they started to introduce rent allowance programs. Recently the 
central government has made a proposal to introduce statewide rent allowance programs to 
help households to pay the rent for the private rental sector. 
The decentralization process was launched in 1990 with the Law on Local Governments. 
However, the first steps had already been undertaken in the mid eighties, when some 
economic freedom was given to the councils with the introduction of investment funds; 
besides that, three targeted subsidies were created for the construction of schools, hospitals 
and housing. With the tax reform and the property asset transfer the way for decentralization 
was paved. The pace of the changes that assured the independence of local governments had 
slowed down by 1994, since by then the institutional setup had been created. The financial 
“freedom” of the local governments had to be cut significantly due to Hungary’s extremely 
large domestic and foreign debt. The asset transfer to the municipalities enabled local 
governments to gain own revenues from either selling the properties or imposing property 
taxes on them. The stabilization program was adopted in 1995, considerably modifying the 
local governments’ financing and lowering the public expenditure in a lot of areas, such as 
social services, education etc. (Teller 2003) The next phase of the public administration 
reform aimed at the establishment of effective functioning, forcing the local governments to 
find incentives for their own development and everyday operation. (Szegváry 2002) Since it is 
the local level that is responsible for the delivery of public services, and some services cannot 
be sufficiently financed from the centrally defined normative and targeted grants, one of the 
most important steps of the reform has been that the local self-governments may impose local 
taxes and use the revenues e.g. from local business tax for their own purposes. Parallel to this, 
choosing the way of service provision was left to local governments: they can contract out 
service delivery and thus provide for economic efficiency (in addition to budgetary 
institutions, private companies, companies with mixed ownership, municipally owned 
companies, NGO’s can also deliver public services, and some concessions have been awarded 
to different companies as well). (Teller 2004) 
Local public services include social welfare services, education and health services, 
environmental protection and local development, transport and public utilities. Local self-
governments have specific functions connected to the delivery of public services. Since 
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 Hungary introduced a three-tier governmental system, which is based on local self-
governments, county self-governments and the central government, there are different 
responsibilities divided among these tiers. Local governments may take over any duties they 
prefer to perform for their inhabitants, supposing this does not affect the completion of the 
obligatory services or violates any legal regulations. In case a municipality is unable to carry 
out “voluntary” tasks, it may pass these on to the upper tier, namely the county self-
government. This body is obliged to take them over according to the regulation that says that 
certain services have to be carried out only from a minimum size of settlement or number of 
inhabitants. (Somogyi-Teller 2004) The size of expenditures related to public services varies 
to a great extent: The largest amount of spending is related to actual costs (including personal 
wages) and to app. 25 % of the local budgets, capital expenditures. When we take a look at 
the distribution of the expenditures by different sectors in 1999, it is the education (33 %) and 
health care (19 %) that are in the first two places of expenditure types; administration stands 
in the third place (13 %), social welfare is the 4th (with app. 7 %), and housing, water, 
transportation and communication represent altogether only 7 %. (Teller 2003) 
Before the transition, residential consumption prices were kept at a very low level and cross-
subsidizing of services was a common tool for equalizing the low revenues and high costs of 
services. After the transition, the need to rationalize public services had to be combined with 
the social implication of reorganization and price increase as well. (Somogyi-Teller 2004) 
This change affected most local governments where the transfer of public utility services 
occurred. This means that it was not only the households that were concerned with problems 
of affordable services, but the owning municipalities as well (as providers of costly services). 
For this, interventions into the social protection system had been launched. 
The social services that local self-governments perform are partially set by the law. 
Nevertheless, in order to reflect the current circumstances of the population and the political 
goals of the local assembly, a large portion of local self-governments take over non-
mandatory duties and provide for a diversity of subsidies to their inhabitants. Typical “local 
solutions” are occasional family aids (above the obligatory), which would help the vulnerable 
in emergency situations, or aids concerning housing (heating subsidy or additional housing 
allowance) that should lessen the burden of the housing expenditures. Housing related 
subsidies can be divided into three types: aids for those already in arrears, housing 
maintenance aid (housing allowance) for owner occupiers, aids for those living in public 
housing (through low rents and rent rebates). While the first two are co-financed (90%) by the 
state, the latter one is depending on local resources and decision. Housing allowance models 
are typically widened by larger settlements even at their own costs.  
Another feature of the social services derives from the residualization process of the housing 
owned by the local governments, which makes the municipally owned sector function as 
housing for the poorest households.  
The number of flats that belong to the municipal housing sector in Hungary represent 
approximately 5 % of the total dwelling stock of the country. This number emerged as the 
result of the privatisation process in Hungary, which began in the late 80-ies and is still in 
progress. Along with the Housing Act, in which the turn of 1995 and 1996 was declared as the 
end of the obligatory privatisation, the privatisation process as such reached its peak. It 
became common that all those tenants who could afford it bought their flats. Therefore, in the 
present public rental sector the remaining flats owned by the municipality are in most cases 
rented by families with lower income and lower social status. (MRI 2002) 
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 Table 5 The number of dwellings owned by the local governments compared to the 
dwelling stock of Hungary, % 
 
Number of dwellings 
owned by the local 
government 
Dwelling stock % 
Budapest 79556 823690 9,7 
Other towns 92722 1809501 5,1 
Village 16620 1428088 1,2 
Total 188898 4061279 4,7 
Source: KSH, 2001 
Local governments enjoy a wide legitimacy in the decision-making process concerning the 
regulation of their rental housing stock. They can freely determine the rent, the conditions of 
selling the dwellings (in accordance with the regulations defined by the Housing Law), as 
well as the conditions of new rental contracts. All these matters are regulated in the local 
decrees issued by the municipalities in accordance with the laws and regulations adopted at 
the national level. The local governments are also eligible to differentiate within the sector of 
municipally owned flats between social and non-social units (the latter referring to units with 
market-based or cost based rents) as indicated in their local social and housing policy. In the 
cities above 50 000 inhabitants, the rate of dwellings owned by the local government is 
estimated to be app. 4-10 %. In total 58 % of the municipal flats are concentrated in the cities 
with populations over 100,000, whereas only 20 % of the units are to be found in the towns 
with populations less than 50,000. (CSO, 2001) 
3.2 Housing policy in the 90s 
The collapse of the centrally planned economy brought about radical changes in the housing 
sector. The new housing regime preferred the privatization and liberalization in the housing 
sector, which increased the significance of homeownership, both as a source of security and 
as a source of insecurity. The “give-away” privatization of 600 thousand units meant a 
massive asset transfer. The security aspect of homeownership played a crucial role as a 
determinant of the household’s motivation to buy the public units. However, privatization 
resulted in a very unequal distribution of the housing assets, which – partly because of the 
price liberalization – increased the insecurity aspect of homeownership at the bottom of the 
income distribution. The legal framework of a market oriented housing system was not in 
place, which increased uncertainty (risks) related to homeownership. House price information 
was not reliable, the land and real estate registration were incomplete, etc. The main problem 
was the gap between the household income and the increasing housing cost, which was not 
bridged by an efficient housing allowance system. The number of the arrears problem 
increased the owner-occupiers’ risk; the likelihood to lose their home became more and more 
real. (Eviction is a new phenomenon in our housing system, and politics is very sensitive to 
this question.)  
 26
 Housing lending disappeared by the mid-90s, however, the poor owners, who could not pay 
off their loans in 1992 at the discounted value faced hardship to pay the market interest rate 
for their outstanding loans (which were equal to 50 % of the original amount). As regards 
housing mobility, the new factor was the “downward mobility” (that is to move from higher 
value home to a smaller value home) in order to match the cash problem. After 2000 the 
subsidized government loan program (interest rate subsidy, PIT mortgage rate deduction, and 
mortgage bond subsidy) increased the outstanding loan from 2 % of the GDP to 8 % of the 
GDP, and in three years around 500 thousand households took loans. Because of the strong 
competition among the banks and because of the not well established underwriting procedure 
there is a fear of producing mass arrears in the next future.  
3.2.1 Housing privatization 
The “engine” of the privatization of the rental stock to the sitting tenants was the insecurity 
related to the future of the rental sector regulation. An end to the central rent control had been 
announced, and it actually ended by 1993. The households were uncertain with respect to the 
future, and the majority of them (80 %) bought the unit with a high price discount.  
Logically the discount played an important role, but it is not “enough”, as we can see from the 
example of Russia where even with the “free of charge” privatization they had lower results. 
Insecurity as the main explanation of the Hungarian housing privatization can be tested 
against the Czech case. In the Czech Republic the privatization is much slower because the 
state rent control remained an important element of the regulation. At the time of the 
privatization (mainly in 1994-1996), the insecurity elements of the homeownership were not 
so clear. 
3.2.2 Legislative framework 
The housing law of 1993 made a step towards a system where the social landlords have more 
rights than before, but some of the important elements of the “old system” remained. The 
point is that the local government “behaviour” became very important with regards to 
property rights. The tendency is that in the social sector the tenants are losing their “property” 
rights. It is becoming more complicated to “sell” the tenancy rights. 
The Land Registration has been modernized, but there are several “holes” in the system. 
Cases have been disclosed when the so-called “housing mafia” grabbed or illegally robbed 
housing units. (We plan to make a case study analyzing the cases when people lost their home 
as a consequence of illegal activity.) 
The Law on Condominiums (2003) made it possible for the “association of the owners” to put 
a mortgage on the unit of the “non-paying” owners. 
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 In the middle of the 90s a number of new laws made the creation of a market based housing 
finance system possible. As a result of these changes in the legal framework, legal tools for 
securing real estate loans and assuring expeditious access to collateral in the event of default 
in a mortgage loan were established.14   
However, the enforcement issue is one the most critical elements of the changes. The utility 
and rent arrears had increased substantially, and, according to the law, even a foreclosure or 
eviction process could be initiated. The banks, local governments and the utility companies, 
however, are cautious to take such actions. In the institutional analysis we will try to map the 
different interests in these processes.  
3.2.3 Housing finance 
In Hungary the housing loan portfolio in 1990 amounted to 15 % of the GDP as a 
consequence of the liberal housing policy in the 80s. This portfolio actually bankrupted the 
Housing Bank (OTP and the government, which guaranteed the loan), and a huge subsidy was 
needed to restructure the portfolio. The majority of the borrowers paid off the loan with a 50 
% discount in 1992-1993. Nevertheless, several thousand households could not or did not 
want to pay the loan back, and their interest rates were increased (against the contract made in 
the 80s), which caused a serious problem for most of them. In 2002 and 2003 a program was 
introduced to manage these repayment arrears. (We plan to make a detailed case study of this 
program.)  
By the end of the 90s, market based housing finance institutions were built up in Hungary, 
partly as a consequence of the bank privatization. However, until the end of the 90’s there 
were no housing loans in Hungary15. (This was basically the same for other Eastern European 
countries, too.) This is a very important fact for interpreting our survey data of 1999 and 
2003. 
Early in 2000 an energetic program targeting the establishment of a housing loan system was 
launched in the Hungarian housing policy. During four years of subsidised housing loans the 
housing loan portfolio grew 8 or 9 times in size; whereas at the beginning of 2000 the loan 
portfolio was approximately HUF 130 billion only; in September 2003 it was HUF 1130 
billion. As a result, the loan ratio within the GDP increased from 1 % in 2000 to 7 % at the 
end of the year 2003. This high increase was facilitated by the fact that the portfolio was at its 
lowest point at the millennium (previously subsidised loans had been mostly paid back and 
there was a minimum of new ones), therefore the development started from almost zero level. 
                                                
14 For example: 1. the 1993 Law on Regulation of Rent and Sale of Housing exempts private landlords from the requirement 
of providing alternative housing to an evicted tenant; 2. amendments to the Civil Code sections on mortgages and liens 
adopted in 1996 and a 1994 law on court procedures permit foreclosure and repossession without the lengthy judicial 
proceedings required under previous law; 3. the Civil Code now permits the lender to sell the property itself without court 
intervention if the parties so agreed in the loan documents; 4. Civil Code amendments provide that for residential real estate, 
the parties may agree that the borrower must deliver the property empty of occupants in the event of foreclosure; 5. the 1997 
Law on Mortgage Banks and Mortgage Bonds changed the priority for payment to a mortgage lender from the proceeds of a 
foreclosure sale from last place to fourth place, ahead of taxes, social security, and other public debt. 
15 Hegedüs J - Várhegyi, É. : The Crisis in Housing Financing in the 1990s in Hungary  Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 9, 1610-
1641, 2000 
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 3.2.4 Housing expenditures  
The most important risk with homeownership until 2002 was related to the increased housing 
costs. Very few (15 % in 2003) households had loans with an average payment 7-8 % of the 
household income. Thus the homeownership’s risk is related to utility cost and not to the loan 
repayment. (It will be important in the future as housing loans started to be issued in 2002.)  
The local governments set the user charges following a general procedure defined by the laws. 
The arrears are an important issue in the sector. According to the housing survey (in 2003) 6 
% of the households had arrears; other sources estimated that 8-10 % of households have 
payment problems. This would be the number one risk factor.  
The condominiums (housing associations) represent intermediary institutions between the 
individual households and the service providers. 45 % of the households live in multi-family 
homes (more than 3 units in a building). It is a very important question how the association of 
owners can enforce their individual members to payment. (This is what the law on 
Condominium is about.) 
3.2.5 Safety net 
A new system of safety net was introduced after the regime change. The housing related 
safety net has two lines of operation: partly through the programs defined by the central 
government (parliament), and partly through local government managed (mixed financed) 
programs. The housing allowances (introduced in 1993) had been financed by the local 
government until 2004. The total amount of the housing allowances was limited, basically 
because of the financial disincentives of the local governments (general grants were 
transferred not tied to housing allowances). In 2004 a major change was introduced.  
The housing allowance programs can be evaluated in the context of other social benefit 
programs. The money transferred through any benefits is fungible, thus we can suppose that a 
substantial part of the income benefits is spent on housing. In Hungary the share of housing 
allowances was around 3.6-4.8 % of the total benefit programs through local governments 
between 1998 and 200216.  
Table 6 Local government benefit programs 
Type of programs 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Income benefits through local governments 69.0% 71.8% 71.0% 70.9% 68.5%
Cost compensation (medicine etc.) 23.7% 22.0% 23.1% 23.5% 25.9%
Housing Allowances 4.8% 4.0% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6%
Total expenditures 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of the GDP 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Sources: König, 2004 
The effectiveness of the safety net programs depends on the incentive structure of the local 
governments. (The local governments own the utility companies, so they are financially 
interested to manage the arrears problem, especially if the costs are shared with the central 
government.)  
                                                
16 Other income transfers should be taken into consideration partly, e.g. pension, family benefits, etc. 
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 3.3 Main consequence of the changes 
3.3.1 Housing policy regimes after the 90s and institutional changes 
After the political changes at the end of the1980s, three stages of the housing policy can be 
identified. In the first period (1989-1994) the government tried to manage the housing crises related 
to the economic decline and the “deep subsidy” system of the socialist period. The government 
“moved out from the housing sector” decreasing the subsidies and diminishing its direct role. The 
decentralization was part of this process as the local governments were assigned to manage the 
housing allowance program partly financed from their own resources.  The housing policy of this 
period could be characterized basically as a crisis management. The Housing Law (1993) and the 
Social Law (1993) made it clear that the government does not take responsibility in housing, but 
leaves it open for a future intervention. The subsidy system – as it was shown – has been changed in 
order to decrease the burden on the budget, but no major changes were realized in the concept of the 
housing policy. The decisions taken in this period made it clear that the politicians did not accept the 
idea of targeting. Nevertheless, this idea became more and more part of the “white paper” programs.  
In the second period (1995-2000) the new institutions were set and the legal background was 
improved. Meanwhile the level of the subsidies gradually decreased as a consequence of the 
decreasing housing output. Two basic financial institutions were set up: the contract saving banks 
and the mortgage banks.  The law on contract savings banks was very controversial as the subsidies 
given to the savers made the housing subsidy system more regressive, and there was no direct 
relation between the subsidies and the increase in housing investments. The changes in the legal 
background of housing finance were an important element of this period. The attempt to tackle the 
problem of the inflationary environment and changes in the subsidy system had a temporary effect 
on the housing sector. The housing policy concept declared the need for the reform in the subsidy 
system, but changes mainly served the purpose of reducing the budget burden. From 1998 a new 
rhetoric was presented in the housing policy, namely the need for the support of the middle-income 
citizens, but for two years nothing important had happened. 
In the third period (after 2000) the government started an active program backed by the positive 
macroeconomic changes. The program introduced new subsidies primarily into the owner occupied 
sector, but into the public rental as well. To increase the effect of the program the subsidies were 
increased step by step, and the new government of 2002 inherited a very controversial system facing 
the problem how to restructure it. 
The new left-wing government elected in 2002 promised in the campaign to keep the subsidies 
unchanged in the housing sector and even promised increases in some elements of the subsidy 
system (e.g. an increase in the premiums for the contract savings and in the upfront down payment 
subsidy for new construction.) The fundamental question is what were the effects of the new 
program, and what kind of options have been left for the government elected in 2002.  
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 3.3.2 Lack of the rental sector and unemployment 
The literature seems to agree that the ownership composition of the housing stock, i.e. the 
large share of owner-occupied homes is one of the key causes of low housing mobility, which 
in turn reduces employees’ ability to adapt to the uneven regional distribution of jobs. 
Consequently, there is a correlation between the lack of rental housing and unemployment.  
The explanation is that, on the one hand, transaction costs of moving in the owner occupied 
housing sector are high and, on the other hand, those labour market regions where the jobs 
exist lack rental housing. A further consequence of the dominance of owner occupied housing 
may be that employees are forced to accept jobs that are the nearest to their homes even if the 
job does not pay well and requires less than their professional qualifications; furthermore, the 
lack of adequate housing supply increases the costs of investment that would create jobs.  
(Oswald, 1999) 
While the share of rental housing had been low (21 %) in Hungary before 1990 by European 
standards, after the privatisation in the 1990s, just as in the rest of the Eastern European 
countries, the share of rental housing fell back to 4 % of the overall stock (HCSO, 2003).. 
Mobility in the private rental sector, however, is extremely high due to chaotic tenant-landlord 
relations rather than to a healthy mobility.  
Housing privatisation, however, cannot be considered to be the primary cause of low mobility 
as tenants in the council rental sector had quasi ownership rights and could practically freely 
move (i.e. „sell”) home. Although the Housing Act of 1993, which defines the legal frames of 
the management of the rental housing stock, limited these rights, tenants (and direct 
descendants living in the same home) dispose of their housing more or less freely17. The share 
of tenants (especially in the private rental sector), who reported that they wanted to change 
their housing situation within the next five years is twice as large as that of owner-occupiers 
(47 % and 19 %, respectively). This, however, is the result of the temporal and 
disadvantageous status of renting rather than of the difference in transaction costs involved in 
moving. 
3.3.3 Significance of local government in the safety net and housing policy 
The local government’s housing and social policies play an important role in the „transaction 
costs” of moving municipality. Within the housing assistance system, local governments 
control 15 to 17 per cent of subsidies (1998-2001). In granting these subsidies, local decrees 
explicitly prefer local residents. The analysis of local housing decrees suggests that the 
criteria for the assignment of council rental housing and granting local subsidies are several 
years’ residence or employment in the municipality. Municipalities (39) covered by a recent 
research project carried out by MRI shows that municipalities provide rental housing 
exclusively for people who have lived there for several (in about half of the municipalities at 
least 5) years, probably partly out of the fear that by opening up the possibility of renting for 
non-residents would lead to heavy inflow of the poor. In the case of local subsidies it is only 
in five municipalities that eligibility criteria do not include local residence. (Teller, 2003) 
                                                
17 The so called fictitious exchange of housing is a still existing practice, yet it is up to the housing department of the 
individual municipalities how strictly they enforce compliance with the law. 
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 On the one hand, moving to another municipality involves losing the local housing assistance, 
and, on the other hand, to meet the criteria of several years of local residence is a serious 
problem because of the narrow private rental market and high prices. In Budapest in 2002 the 
average private rent (HUF 935 /m2) was nearly two and a half times as high as rents in other 
cities or towns (HCSO, 2002). Regional differences thus are reflected in private rents, too. 
The private rental housing market is a problem not only in terms of high prices but also of 
legal uncertainties. Research on the private rental sector in Budapest estimated the share of 
landlords at 30 or 40 per cent who do not let their tenants officially register in the housing 
(Kis, 2003), which means that such tenants will not become eligible for assistance connected 
to residence even after several years of living there. 
3.3.4 High risks and transaction cost in the housing sector 
In international comparison housing mobility18 (moving house by households) in Hungary is 
rather low. Annually 3 to 4.5 % of households move whereas in Western European countries 
the rate is significantly greater. (Hegedüs, 2001). In welfare economics theory, low mobility 
causes serious negative impacts primarily by undermining the efficiency of programs targeted 
at reducing unemployment, and inflexible consumption of housing contributes to the under-
use of the housing wealth and thus creates additional social costs. 
Low housing mobility is often explained by various cultural and social factors, but these 
explanations lack empirical underpinning and often build on historically ungrounded 
stereotypes. Here these factors will not be discussed and the focus will be on those that 
explain households’ behaviour, assuming that households – within the constraints of 
information available for them – make rational decisions.  
The first of these factors is that changing housing in the owner-occupied sector is one of the 
most important economic decisions of a household, fundamentally affecting the household’s 
portfolio. (In Hungary, 96 % of housing is owner occupied). The average value of housing 
amounts to 5 or 6 times the household’s annual income. (The housing price/income ratio in 
1999 was 5.9 while in 2003 6.5.) This means that a bad decision on the housing transaction 
(for instance that a household under-evaluates their housing by 20 % or over-evaluates the 
new housing by 20 %) may put more than a year’s income at risk. This especially constrains 
mobility, i.e. increases risks, in the case when there is no correct information available on the 
trends of housing prices.19
                                                
18 Hereafter by housing mobility long-term relocation of a household is meant. In the empirical research, „long-term” means 
a period of time longer than six months. This definitions is different from the usual definitions of migration mobility, Thus, in 
the housing surveys by HCSO in 1999 and 2003 housing mobility rates are somewhat lower, yet in several aspects provide a 
more realistic picture of long-term processes in the housing market. The weight of temporary relocation is probably smaller 
in the Hungarian housing market as the rental housing stock, which is supposed to make it possible, is practically missing. 
19 The efficiency of the automobile market is greatly increased by highly standardised prices of second hand cars, thus 
making „ the probability of loss” much smaller than in the real estate market. 
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 Moving housing involves substantial taxation and financial burdens. Duties, the registration 
fee and the potential hiring of a real estate agent may increase actual transaction costs. In 
Hungary20, of direct transaction costs, the duty is the greatest item, though the average duty of 
4,5 to 5 per cent is not high in western standards.21 While many researchers have pointed out 
the negative correlation between the amount of transaction costs and housing mobility; the 
actual impact mechanisms, however, are supposed to be much more complex. 
Lack of information and knowledge of the housing market is an important factor too. While 
this factor is naturally interrelated with risks caused by the great value of housing property as 
an asset, it does play a role in itself. To know prices, of course, is of primary importance but 
there are several other risk factors that must not be disregarded, such as the reliability of 
ownership register documents, which can be one of the factors restraining housing mobility22. 
Also, the time requirement of selling housing is part of transaction costs.  
Most researchers consider the high rate of owner-occupation as one of the main causes of low 
mobility as indeed owner-occupation increases transaction costs partly because of the above 
listed factors. 
High transaction costs necessarily reduce housing mobility and the efficiency of the housing 
sector23. Housing mobility, however, is also connected to housing finance and assistance 
systems. For instance, it is a widely known interrelation that low and controlled rents limit 
mobility as families are reluctant to resign of the „hidden” assistance (Hegedüs-Tosics, 1992). 
An underdeveloped housing finance system discourages mobility, as buying housing without 
affordable loans is not an option even for middle and upper-middle income households.  
Factors that impact mobility within the same settlement naturally work in the case of 
relocation between localities too. Regional mobility, however, is more forcefully influenced 
by some of these factors. In the communist regime, the lack of a housing finance system led to 
the strengthening of a self-help system of housing construction in which people, relatives or 
friends, received and gave help in building their homes both financially and „in-kind”; this 
system greatly contributed to the conservation of the regional structure of settlements. Current 
municipal housing policies too contribute to the rigidity of this structure and to low regional 
mobility.  
                                                
20 The amount of the duty is 2% of the market value of housing in case the price is less than HUF 4 million, and 6% of the 
value on top of the  HUF 4 million band. The law provides two kind of relief: in case of newly constructed housing by a 
company the buyer is exempted from paying the fee, and first time buyers under 35 are granted a 50% reduction, limited at 
HUF 40 thousand (if the price of the housing is not more than HUF 8 million). 
21 In France and Belgium the duty is over 10%, but in the UK and Italy it is less than 3%. (Mclennan, 1998) 
22 It is not accidental that in developed countries a separate insurance product, the title insurance, has been developed to 
reduce risk of loss due to „erroneous” registration. 
23 According to Lruvrnsteijn and Ommeren (2002), a one percent increase in transaction costs reduces the probability of 
moving within the owner-occupation sector by 8%.  
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 4 The micro study of the insecurity elements of 
homeownership 
4.1 Privatization and the insecurity issue 
4.1.1 Moving from the “unitary” to a “residual” rental sector 
In the pre-transition period the main features of the Hungarian public rental sector was the 
very low rent level, the huge backlog in maintenance, and the ownership rights of tenants. The 
share of the public rental sector was around 20 % of the stock, but close to 40 % in urban 
settlements.  The rental sector operated as a “unitary” system (Kemeny, 1985) in the sense of 
the social composition of the tenants. Moreover, the critical analysis of the socialist housing 
system points out that access to the public rentals was distributed unevenly among different 
social and income groups, and the better-off families enjoyed better chances to get into the 
rental housing (Szelényi 1983, Dániel 1985). However, this fact could be explained partly by 
the allocation policy (“role of the state”), but partly by market allocation. 30-35 % of the 
tenants in 1992 accessed their units through private transactions i.e., that they bought their 
units on the 'gray market'. (Hegedüs, Mark and Tosics, 1994).  
Until 1994, the local governments were free to make any decisions on privatization. The 
majority of the local governments supported the privatization both out of short-term political 
and longer-term financial considerations. The political reason for privatization on the part of 
the local governments was to “favour” their residents, and they were supported by “faith” in 
privatization in general. (Housing privatization was strongly proposed by international donor 
agencies as well.) There were several financial reasons for privatization, such as the backlog 
in maintenance, and the continuous operational losses, as the rents did only cover 30-45 % of 
the actual cost. A key element in the local governments' privatisation decision was what 
future rent levels could be. The local governments expected high political pressure in the case 
of rent increase. The facts show that privatization speeded up in the first years of 90s, and 
after the “soft” right to buy Housing Law of 1993 a new impetus was given to the 
privatization.  
On the household side, direct financial considerations were determining the willingness to buy 
the units. The main financial motivation was to capitalise the potential 'value-gap' of the rental 
unit, i.e., to capture the difference in the value of the unit as a rental vs. an owner-occupied 
unit. Beside the “value gap” the security issue was the most important. It is true that public 
tenants had enjoyed a high security of tenure in the past forty years, and they had enjoyed low 
rents, with rent increases below inflation. After the regime change, most of the tenants 
expected rent increases and the shrinking of their ownership-rights (e.g., the right of tenure 
swapping or inheritance). The households' opinion on rent increase – whether it would be 
lower or higher than inflation – indicated the effect of this factor. Strong expectations of high 
rent increase had pushed the households towards buying their units in order to become a 
homeowners in a more secure situation. The other security issue was the control over 
maintenance.  
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 One of the most common complaints of public tenants was the low performance of the public 
maintenance companies. Households would have liked to obtain decision-making rights in 
maintenance, including the opportunity to choose the organisation, to have supervision over 
costs and to be able to direct the maintenance activity toward cheaper solutions.  
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Figure 5 Privatization of the rental units to the sitting tenants (1990-2003) 
Altogether 5 % of the stock remained in ownership of the municipalities due to several 
reasons. A part of the stock - mostly in the cultural heritage areas in old city centres - were 
disclosed from privatization (if the municipality decided so), another part was kept in the 
hands of the municipalities in order to assure mobility for personnel in their own 
organizations (e.g. schools, hospitals managed by the municipalities). Nevertheless, in the 
overwhelming rest of the flats that could not be sold, the sitting tenants remained as renters of 
municipal units. This had a number of motives that are connected to the insecurity aspect of 
homeownership, namely, that in their case buying the flats would not have been possible due 
to lack of financial resources or existing arrears. They could not have borne the financial 
burden of paying the rates of credits or even any expenses related to housing maintenance 
(e.g. those of repair). As a result, the municipal housing stock residualized, which becomes 
obvious when we explore the composition of households that remained in these units. The 
control of the municipalities over privatization had diminished by 1993 (since by then a 
common decision of the renters in the given multi-unit building was required; only buildings 
with an achieved consensus were sold). Nevertheless, higher value housing had already been 
sold by that time, and after 1996 40 % of the privatized stock belonged to the lowest value 
quintile. According to the survey results carried out in 1999, the lower the status of the 
household is, the more of them are present in municipal housing: 44 % of households where 
the head of a family is an unskilled worker live in municipal rental, whereas this ratio is only 
8,4 % among the white-collar workers. It is an interesting fact that the most active privatizing 
households by 1999 were those with old (above 60 years) heads. (KSH 2001)  
The process of the residualisation can be followed with the help of the Table 7: the average 
household income in the public rental sector decreased form 86 % to 74 % expressed as a % 
of household income in the owner occupied sector.  
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 Table 7 Household income (100=hh income in owner-occupied sector) 
 1992 1995 1999 2003 
Public rental 86% 87% 84% 74% 
Source: 1992,1995 HHP, 1999, 2003 Housing Survey (CSO) 
4.1.2 Explaining privatization  
Housing privatization in Hungary led to a residual rental sector, as households with higher 
income and stable employment background had better chances to buy their units.  
With the data of 1992 (Budapest Rental Survey) we set up a model to explain the probability 
to buy. In each model, the independent variable of the model is PRIV, which has a value of 1 
if the unit has been privatised,7 and 0 if it has not been sold (see Table 8).  
First we set a model (MODEL 1) to test the two hypotheses. The results prove unquestionably 
that the value-gap has an important role in defining the probability to buy. The expectation of 
rent increase (REXP), on the other hand, does not have a significant effect. But if we create an 
interaction variable with both rent expectations and the value-gap, we get an improvement in 
the model, which indicates that the variable has an effect on the probability to buy. The 
explanation is that rent expectations play a role in the increase of the value-gap, that is, the 
'propensity to buy' is proportional with a compound of expected rent increase and value-gap.  
In the second step (MODEL 2) we tested the effect of housing characteristics. The results 
show that the most important variable is location: that is, households in the better districts 
(Buda districts and the inner city area) are more eager to buy their units. The size of the flat 
and the condition variables had a significant effect on the probability function. (This is not a 
surprise as these variables are correlated with the value of the unit.)  
In the third step (MODEL 3) we tested the effect of household characteristics. This model has 
less explanatory strength, but the income and consumption level has a significant effect. 
Finally, we introduced all our variables (MODEL 4). The result of the stepwise logistic 
regression is that the value-gap, rent expectations and the location of the unit explain best the 
probability of buying.  
Following the same logic of model building, we tried to explain the probability of the decision 
not to buy (see Table 8). The variables in the separate models (MODEL 1 to MODEL 3) 
behave in the same way, although of course with a negative sign. One interesting conclusion 
is that the social factors are more significant in the decision not to buy than in a positive 
decision to buy. However, in the final model housing conditions and the social factor 
(income) play more important roles than the value-gap and the rent expectations, whose 
contributions to the model were not significant.  
The conclusion of the analysis is that, as we had initially hypothesized, the value-gap and rent 
expectations are the most important determinants of the purchase, while the location of the 
unit adds a further incentive to buy. The social determinants of the process are less crucial to 
the process, but of course there is a positive correlation between the social status and the 
value-gap. The other result of the analysis is that the negative attitude towards privatisation is 
less influenced by the value-gap, and more by social position (income, consumption), and 
really poor housing quality.  
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 Table 8    Estimation of the Probability of Purchase of a Public Rental Unit  
  Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Constant -2.4691 -4.5141 -2.0353 -1.9655 
    (175.96) (98.87) (78.01) (74.39) 
Hypothesis 1-2   
  VGAP 1.82E-06     4.36E-06
    (59.08)     (50.93) 
  REXP *     * 
  VGAP x REXP 5.18E-07     6.02E-07
    (6.77)     (74.39) 
Background Variables 
Characteristics  of the Unit 
  Floor   0.015   * 
      (19.48)     
  Heat   *   * 
  Bath    6.6198   * 
      (4.63)     
  W.C.   *   * 
  CONDF   0.2995   * 
      (6.18)     
  CONDH   0.389   * 
      (12.41)     
Characteristics  of the Household 
  INC     1,55E-03 * 
        (8.22)   
  PROP     * * 
  CONS     0.6737 * 
        (8.13)   
  SCH1     * * 
  SCH2     * * 
  NUM     * * 
  Model Chi-Squared 88,004 84,97 23,508 98,57 
  Degrees of Freedom 2 4 2 3 
  Significance 0 0 0 0 
  Number of Cases 985 985 901 893 
* Variables not significant in the model  
Notes: Logistic regression model with forward step algorithm; Ward coefficient in brackets 
PRIV - (DEPENDENT variable) equal 1 if the unit was bought, 0 else; VGAP - Market value 
of the unit minus the selling price; REXP - Rent expectation 1 if rent increase is expected to 
be higher than the price inflation; VGAP x REXP - the interaction variable between VGAP 
and REXPC; FLOOR - floor area of the unit in m2; HEAT central heating 1, else O; W.C. - 
W.C. in the flat 1, else 0; BATH - separate bathroom in the flat 1, else 0; CONDF - condition 
of the unit in scale 1-S; CONDH - condition of the house in a scale 1-S; KERA - districts on 
Buda side; KERB - districts of inner Pest; PROP - ownership of a second home, plot: yes 1, 
no 0; INCOME - monthly households' income; CONS - ownership of the durable 
consumption goods: yes 1, no 0; SCHl - higher education 1, else 0; SCH2 - grammar school 1, 
else 0; NUM - members of the family.  
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 On the basis of empirical information we checked which factors played the biggest role in the 
decisions of individual families to buy or not. In general, there are two strong motives for 
buying: to acquire the value-gap and to obtain a secure position against changes in rental 
policy. The tenure security motive was cited by between 36 and 47 per cent of the three 
groups of respondents, who have purchased or are considering purchase, while the wealth 
acquisition motive was mentioned in 38 to 44 per cent of the cases. The control over 
maintenance is much less important and is only seriously taken into consideration by those 
households that will not buy their units. Only 13.5 per cent of those who have already 
purchased their unit mentioned it as a motivation, while slightly over 20 per cent of those 
considering or planning purchase mentioned it.  
Table 9 What were the reasons to buy?  
  1. place 2. place 
Financial 52.2 19.1 
Security  41.8 65 
Control over the maintenance 6 15.9 
Total 100 100 
(N) 588 320 
Source: Budapest Panel Survey, 1992 
4.2 Household arrears: factors determining the insecurity aspect of the 
homeownership  
The most important question is what are the main factors determining the insecurity of owner-
occupiers in 1999 and in 2003. We will examine the factors influencing the odds to have 
arrears in 1999 and in 2003 according to a national housing survey conducted by CSO (See 
Appendix about the data.) 
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Figure 6 The percentage of the respondents 
who had arrears in the last years according 
to the value of their home 
Figure 7 The percentage of the respondents 
who had arrears in the last years according 
to the income quintiles 
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 The share of households having arrears24 decreased from 9 % to 6 % between 1999 and 2003. 
The trend – as it can be expected – is that both years the odds to have arrears decreasing 
moving from the lowest income group to the highest income group and moving from 
households with low-value housing towards the high-value housing.  
However, we were more interested in the social and economic factors “explaining” the 
arrears. Firstly, with descriptive statistics we explored the effects of basic social and 
demographic variables; secondly we set up a logit regression model to see the relative 
strength of the different factors.  
The most important conclusions of the descriptive statistics are: 
The odds to have arrears are higher in Budapest than in the other settlements, but the 
differences were on the decrease from 1999 to 2003 
The households in public housing have arrears with a much higher probability than 
households in the owner occupation; this trend has become stronger after 1999.  
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Figure 8 Households in arrears according to 
settlement type 
Figure 9 Households in arrears according 
to tenure type 
Housing costs in various settlements differ to a great extent, so the income inequalities 
contribute to the arrears distribution according to settlement type. Since in most villages 
housing consumption (e.g. heating) can be better controlled due to the construction type of the 
houses, fewer arrears emerge. The data prove that the residualized rental sector faces more 
serious social problems; households in arrears are strongly over represented in this sector.  
Households in multi-family units have arrears with higher probability than the 
households living in one-family houses. 
Households living in units with higher value have arrears with lower probability than 
households living in less valuable units. 
                                                
24 The questions put in the two surveys were: 1999: Did you have any arrears in the past year? 2003: Did you have any 
arrears for more than 2 months in the past year?  
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Figure 10 Households in arrears according 
to building type 
Figure 11 Households in arrears according 
to value of units (quintiles) 
As pointed out above, fewer households in single-unit buildings have arrears, which can be in 
connection with the fact that housing consumption in these buildings can be better controlled. 
The stratification of the value of the units is connected to the payment capacity of the 
households living in them. This means that more families in lower value units have arrears 
than those better-off families living in higher deciles of housing.  
Households with higher education have arrears with less probability.  
The households with older “head” of household have arrears with significantly less 
probability. 
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Figure 12 Households in arrears according 
to education 
Figure 13 Households in arrears according 
to age of the head of the household 
Since their position on the job market is more secure, households with members with higher 
education fall in fewer cases into arrears than those with lower qualifications. Households 
with older members tend to have less arrears, which is also connected to their housing 
consumption habits, namely that they are inclined to cover these emerging expenses rather 
than spend on other consumption. (Also, they have less lasting expenses occurring from 
labour access, education of children, etc.).  
Per capita income has an important effect on the probability to have arrears, the effect 
of the household is not straightforward 
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 The share of households with arrears is increasing among the one-parent households 
and bigger families (n of family members) 
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Figure 14 Households in arrears according 
to per capita income (quintiles) 
Figure 15 Households in arrears according 
to number of family members 
25% 
20% 
1999 
15% 
10% 
5% 
0% 
Falling into arrears emerges in the case of cash-poor households; hence those in the lowest 
quintile have five times the chance to have prevailing difficulties with paying the housing 
costs. Since large families are more vulnerable, they tend to fall into arrears more than those 
living in small households. 
The probability to be in arrears increases significantly among the households who 
have unemployed adults 
The households who have loans have arrears with almost two times higher probability 
than households with loan repayment burden 
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Figure 16 Households in arrears according 
to unemployed adult family members 
Figure 17 Households in arrears according 
to the existence of loan repayment 
Due to the lack of the social net, unemployed people are one of the most vulnerable groups. 
Since unemployment benefits are provided only for a relatively short period of time, and are 
only a smaller portion of the previous earnings, households losing one income resource are 
endangered to fall into arrears. Loan repayment is an expense type that would put additional 
burden on families, and hence they would rather fall into arrears than those without loans.  
1 2 4 3 5
2003 
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We analysed the factors influencing the odds to have arrears in the data set of 1999 and 2003 
with the help of the logit model. (See the detailed analyses in the Appendix.) 
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Figure 18 The Exp (B) parameter for the year 1999 and 2003 
 
The conclusion is that the following factors play an important role determining the arrears 
issue: 
• Settlement type (Budapest and the urban settlements) 
• Low income (per capita) 
• Low housing value 
• Public housing 
• Unemployment 
• Loan repayment (mortgage) 
• One-parent households 
• Tenure in multi-unit buildings 
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 We can conceptualize these factors:   
• Underclass (low-income, big families, low education)25 
• Unemployed: out of the labour market 
• Family problems (one-parent households) 
• Limitation of the household consumption  
 
It is worth noting that the structure of the factors is quite stable in time. The relative strengths 
of the variables have not changed dramatically between 1999 and 2003.26   
 
Beside the arrears variable we will check the subjective hardship paying the cost through the 
years of 1992, 1995, 1998, 2003. 
The rent has not increased with the same rate as the inflation in the 90s.  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Average rent (1990=100)
Consumer prive index
(1990=100)
 
Figure 19 Average public rent and the consumer price index  
Source: Housing Statistics CSO, 2003 
                                                
25 In the Rental Panel Survey (1995) 40 % of the roma households had arrears. If we control the other effects of other 
variables they have 2.3 times higher probability to get arrears problem than the non-roma households.   
26 We have done the same analysis for the Budapest Rental Panel Survey data from 1995. The most important variables 
explaining the arrears were public rental sector, unemployment and one-parent households. 
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5 Conclusion 
This study has discussed the risk elements of homeownership in the Hungarian housing 
system using the methods of quantitative analysis. Several issues have been raised which 
would be relevant for the ensuing qualitative research. (Workpackage 2) 
The study concluded that there are common features in the transition process of the housing 
sector. Thus the conclusions based on the Hungarian cases could be useful for forming 
hypotheses for the other accession and transition countries.  
One of the most important elements of the transition is the change in the tenure structure. This 
process is partly related to the privatisation of the state/municipal owned housing stock to the 
sitting tenants (and less frequently to the ex-owner: restitution), and partly to the 
“redefinition” of tenures. For example, the definition of the property right related to the 
different tenure forms has been transformed, thus it is not clear what the risk and security 
elements of the different tenure forms are. The qualitative research will explore the ways of 
various perceptions of the risk and security elements of the tenure form. For instance, 
according to the Budapest Panel Survey data,  88 percentage of the households who bought 
their home thought that the sate should have some responsibility for the rehabilitation of the 
privatized buildings. This assumption reflects the misconception about tenure. 
The Hungarian case study demonstrated that the risk (of the future rent increase) was one of 
the most important factors determining the household intention to buy. The three basic tenure 
forms in Hungary (public rental, private rental and owner-occupied) are in transformation in 
terms of their legal, social and economic nature. For example, the rent arrears legally led to 
eviction, but practically 30-50 % of the tenants have arrears in the public sector. Or the 
changes in condominium law redefined the rights of the individual owners in terms of 
influencing the maintenance and renewal of the multi-unit buildings. The important 
conclusion is that the qualitative study should provide some insight of the individual 
perceptions of the risks and security elements of the different tenures.  
The most important insecurity element was the problem of arrears mostly related to utilities, 
not to loan repayments. We identified four factors influencing the odds to have arrears: 
“underclass” position, unemployment, divorces, and the lack of control over housing cost 
(multi unit buildings). In the qualitative study we should focus on identifying and separating 
these factors. The emerging housing finance system will raise the risks involved in the high 
mortgage activity. This is a new phenomenon, but its significance is increasing, especially 
with loans based on foreign currency.  
The management structure of buildings greatly influences the risks of homeownership. One of 
the consequences of privatization was the emergence of thousands of condominiums replacing 
the big state owned management companies. The qualitative research has to highlight what 
role these intermediaries played.  
In the past few years there has been a boom in lending for housing, which has increased the 
risk element of homeownership. As it is a fairly recent development, our quantitative analysis 
has not yet been able to capture this phenomenon. The qualitative research will have to deal 
with this issue. 
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 6 Methodological Appendix 
6.1 The data sets 
Budapest Rental Panel Survey 1992-1995: The samples were not connected to each other 
(thus they are not panel, but repeated consecutive surveys). The sample size in 1992 was 987, 
and in 1995 1003.  
Housing Survey 1999: The survey was carried out with the inclusion of 10754 units and the 
persons living in the flats (28073).  
The selection criteria were the following: the households’ number should be representative on 
the county level and according to the settlement type. They were chosen on the basis of the 
1996 Micro census. The data set is representative for the whole country. 
In order to reflect the lack of information concerning the housing sector that occurred due to 
the transitional processes (s/a transformation of tenure, drawback of the state from housing, 
diminishing of housing subsidies), the updated Census data could no longer provide for 
sufficient data e.g. for decisions made related to housing, access to housing, and the state of 
the housing stock in Hungary. Therefore, a comprehensive variable set was formed that 
explored the following topics: 
• quality of stock 
• tenure structure 
• access of housing 
• renovations (or enlargement) carried out in the unit 
• households’ investments into housing 
• intention to move (housing history)  
• affordability of housing and housing expenditure  
• value of housing 
• household characteristics 
Housing Survey 2003: The 2003 survey explored 12900 units, but the long questionnaires 
were only filled out if there were some “peculiar” events (renovation, moving), or the 
inhabitants indicated their intention to move in no later than 5 years. As a result, 8000 full 
cases were included. The data set is representative for the whole country. 
The addresses were taken from the 2001 Census, the observation units were the flats. The 
sample was structured according to regions, settlement size and settlement development level. 
The observation units were chosen according to the derived housing characteristics gained 
from the yearly updated data of the 2001 Census. Since new constructions could not be 
included, new housing from 1998-2001 was over represented.  
The questions explored were in accordance with the topics of the previous survey; in addition, 
questions related to intention to move to supported rental units were included. 
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 Hungarian Household Panel Survey 1992-1997: The first wave was conducted in 1992, and 
five further waves have been conducted.  The reference population is Hungarian non-
institutional households, of which about 2,000- 2,500 have been sampled in each wave.  The 
main variables covered are: social status, wealth, income, economic and financial strategies, 
employment histories and housing circumstances.  The surveys have been undertaken by the 
Hungarian Social Research Informatics Centre (TARKI) and the Sociology Department of the 
Budapest University of Economics. 
6.2 House prices 
The estimation of the market value is based on the respondents' evaluation of their own unit. 
40-60 % of those surveyed answered a question asking how much money they could get for 
their unit if it were private property. Using this data, OLS regression analyses were used to 
define a hedonic function. The aim of the analysis was to get a good estimate of the real 
market price. In the first step we selected the outliers (cases in which the market value was set 
above a certain realistic limits). In the second step, we ran OLS regression models with 
stepwise method, including all of the variables, and defined the preliminary function. Using 
this function we dropped again the extreme outliers (the criterion being the distance from the 
predicted value). We then reran the regression function, but only with the variables, which 
had been significant in the earlier regression model. For the year 1992, 1995 the HHP data is 
used, for the years of 1999, 2003 the Housing Survey data is used.  
6.3 Logit model: explaining the arrears 
The logit model was based on the assumption that there is a variety of aspects that have an 
influence on the probability of falling into arrears as the most relevant source of insecurity. 
The evidences gained from previous descriptive analysis were tested by the involving of the 
following variables (the observations’ number is given for the 1999 and 2003 data set): 
6.3.1 Settlement type 
The survey classified the settlements into four groups: The capital city, Budapest, county 
seats, other towns and villages. 
Table 10 Settlement type, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumula-
tive 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumula-
tive 
Percent 
Valid Budapest 2191 20,4 20,4 20,4 Budapest 785964 20,5 20,5 20,5 
  County 
seats 2131 19,8 19,8 40,2 
County 
seats 771830 20,2 20,2 40,7 
  Other 
towns 2715 25,2 25,2 65,4 
Other 
towns 975254 25,5 25,5 66,2 
  Villages 3717 34,6 34,6 100,0 Villages 1293279 33,8 33,8 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
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 2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumula-
tive 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumula-
tive 
Percent 
Valid Budapest 1748 19,9 19,9 19,90 Budapest 771234 20,6 20,6 20,6 
  County 
seats 
1500 17,1 17,1 36,99 County 
seats 
666633 17,8 17,8 38,4 
  Other 
towns 
2715 30,9 30,9 67,9 Other 
towns 
1123759 30,0 30,0 68,4 
  Villages 2818 32,1 32,1 100 Villages 1181568 31,6 31,6 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0  Total 3743195 100,0 100,0   
 
6.3.2 Tenure type 
The tenure type explored in the survey included all relevant types of housing (owner-
occupation, public rental, private rental, and official housing). However, we regrouped these 
tenure types in order to explore the residualized public tenants’ probabilities to fall into 
arrears. 
Table 11 Municipal rental, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ,00 10149 94,4 94,4 94,4 ,00 3613565 94,4 94,4 94,4 
  1,00 605 5,6 5,6 100,0 1,00 212762 5,6 5,6 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0  
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 8410 95,8 95,8 95,8 No 3589057 95,9 95,9 95,9 
  Yes 371 4,2 4,2 100 Yes 154138 4,1 4,1 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0  Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
 
 
6.3.3 Number of units in the building 
The survey explored the building types where the households live. The data set had the 
reported number of the flats in the given unit; we recoded the variable into buildings where 
there are less than 4 units and where there are more. This differentiation made it possible to 
control different housing consumption strategies which are connected to the technical setup of 
the buildings. 
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 Table 12 Number of the unit sin the building, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 to 3 6651 61,8 61,8 61,8 1 to 3 2370905 62,0 62,0 62,0
  more 4103 38,2 38,2 100,0 more 1455422 38,0 38,0 100,0
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0  
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 to 3 5728 65,2 65,2 65,2 1 to 3 2420869 64,7 64,7 64,7
  more 3053 34,8 34,8 100,0 more 1322326 35,3 35,3 100,0
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
 
6.3.4 Value of unit, quintiles 
The households were asked about their estimation about the unit’s value. This price was then 
corrected with several parameters: region, equipment, quality with a regression model. 
6.3.5 Age of the head of the household 
The households were asked about their birth date. This data was recoded into age groups. 
Table 13 Age of the head of the household, 1999 and 2003 
 
1999 
 Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  - 35 1704 15,8 15,8 15,8  - 35 609489 15,9 15,9 15,9 
  36-45 1995 18,6 18,6 34,4 36-45 710681 18,6 18,6 34,5 
  46-55 2195 20,4 20,4 54,8 46-55 779188 20,4 20,4 54,9 
  56-65 1856 17,3 17,3 72,1 56-65 661146 17,3 17,3 72,1 
  65- 3004 27,9 27,9 100,0 65- 1065823 27,9 27,9 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Vali
d 
 - 35 1641 18,7 18,7 18,7  - 35 544985 14,6 14,6 14,6
  36-45 1637 18,6 18,6 37,3 36-45 643230 17,2 17,2 31,7
  46-55 1884 21,5 21,5 58,8 46-55 808693 21,6 21,6 53,3
  56-65 1588 18,1 18,1 76,9 56-65 737097 19,7 19,7 73,0
  65- 2031 23,1 23,1 100,0 65- 1009191 27,0 27,0 100,0
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
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 6.3.6 Household income per capita, quintiles (RB and HT) 
In the survey of 2003, the households were asked to indicate their monthly net income. (5% of 
the households did not give any answer.) Based on the indicated incomes, a linear regression 
function was produced with the aim to replace any missing answers. The dependent variable 
in the model was the e based logarithm of the household income. In order to estimate the 
income, we ordered the average of the characteristic income to each of the professions (based 
on their 4-digit FEOR code). In the case of those with income we added up all average 
incomes and thus we received a well estimated job income. In the model this variable was a 
continuous variable, which explained 69% of all variance. From the variables in the survey 
we produced dummy variables and included them in the estimation equation with stepwise 
method. The weighted reported average income is 120 thousand HUF, the regressed average 
income 134 thousand HUF. The model fitted well to the observations.  
6.3.7 Number of members in the households 
The number of household members was asked. 
Table 14 Number of the people living in the household, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
 Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 2747 25,5 25,5 25,5 1 976686 25,5 25,5 25,5 
  2 3272 30,4 30,4 56,0 2 1159913 30,3 30,3 55,8 
  3 2023 18,8 18,8 74,8 3 723014 18,9 18,9 74,7 
  4 1816 16,9 16,9 91,7 4 648937 17,0 17,0 91,7 
  5 627 5,8 5,8 97,5 5 221751 5,8 5,8 97,5 
  6 191 1,8 1,8 99,3 6 68450 1,8 1,8 99,3 
  7 50 ,5 ,5 99,7 7 17673 ,5 ,5 99,7 
  8 19 ,2 ,2 99,9 8 6602 ,2 ,2 99,9 
  9 4 ,0 ,0 100,0 9 1289 ,0 ,0 99,9 
  10 4 ,0 ,0 100,0 10 1647 ,0 ,0 100,0 
  13 1 ,0 ,0 100,0 13 365 ,0 ,0 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1,00 2004 22,8 22,8 22,8 1,00 943754 25,2 25,2 25,2 
  2,00 2594 29,5 29,5 52,4 2,00 1152726 30,8 30,8 56,0 
  3,00 1626 18,5 18,5 70,9 3,00 671457 17,9 17,9 73,9 
  4,00 1664 19,0 19,0 89,8 4,00 662431 17,7 17,7 91,6 
  5,00 596 6,8 6,8 96,6 5,00 208704 5,6 5,6 97,2 
  6,00 202 2,3 2,3 98,9 6,00 71642 1,9 1,9 99,1 
  7,00 54 ,6 ,6 99,5 7,00 17875 ,5 ,5 99,6 
  8,00 24 ,3 ,3 99,8 8,00 8049 ,2 ,2 99,8 
  9,00 9 ,1 ,1 99,9 9,00 3847 ,1 ,1 99,9 
  10,00 5 ,1 ,1 100,0 10,00 1789 ,0 ,0 100,0 
  11,00 3 ,0 ,0 100,0 11,00 920 ,0 ,0 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
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 6.3.8 Families with dependent children, single parent households and single 
households 
The survey explored the family structure of asked households. There were 25 different 
categories, out of which different family types were focused on: families with dependent 
children, single parent families, and single households.  
 
Table 15 Couples with dependent children, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 6000 55,8 55,8 55,8 No 2132357 55,7 55,7 55,7 
  Yes 4754 44,2 44,2 100,0 Yes 1693970 44,3 44,3 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 5766 65,7 65,7 65,7 No 2555861 68,3 68,3 68,3 
  Yes 3015 34,3 34,3 100,0 Yes 1187334 31,7 31,7 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
 
Table 16 Single parent households, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not 
single 
parents 
9650 89,7 89,7 89,7 
Not single 
parents 3435648 89,8 89,8 89,8 
  Single 
parents 1104 10,3 10,3 100,0 
Single 
parents 390679 10,2 10,2 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not 
single 
parents 
7933 90,3 90,3 90,3
Not single 
parents 3377102 90,2 90,2 90,2 
  Single 
parents 848 9,7 9,7 100,0
Single 
parents 366093 9,8 9,8 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0  Total 3743195 100,0 100,0
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 Table 17 Single households, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not 
single 8061 75,0 75,0 75,0 
Not 
single 2868139 75,0 75,0 75,0 
  Single 2693 25,0 25,0 100,0 Single 958188 25,0 25,0 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not 
single 6814 77,6 77,6 77,6
Not 
single 2812620 75,1 75,1 75,1
  Single 1967 22,4 22,4 100,0 Single 930575 24,9 24,9 100,0
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0  
 
6.3.9 Education 
The head of the household was asked about his/her highest education level. There are 7 
different levels of education: unfinished primary school (less than 8 years at school), finished 
primary school, trade school (3 years of professional training without A level exam), technical 
school (4 years of professional training with A level exam, entrance possibility to college or 
university), secondary school (4 years, A level exam, entrance possibility to college or 
university), college degree (3 years, BA), university degree (5 years, MA, MSc, MLA). 
Table 18 Level of education, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid unfinished 
primary 
school 
1467 13,6 13,6 13,6
unfinished 
primary 
school
516469 13,5 13,5 13,5 
  finished 
primary 
school 
2466 22,9 22,9 36,6
finished 
primary 
school
872795 22,8 22,8 36,3 
  trade 
school 2921 27,2 27,2 63,7
trade 
school 1042560 27,2 27,2 63,6 
  technical 
school 1555 14,5 14,5 78,2
technical 
school 557779 14,6 14,6 78,1 
  secondary 
school 831 7,7 7,7 85,9
secondary 
school 295916 7,7 7,7 85,9 
  college 
degree 768 7,1 7,1 93,1
college 
degree 275073 7,2 7,2 93,1 
  university 
degree 746 6,9 6,9 100,0
university 
degree 265735 6,9 6,9 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
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 2003 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
unfinished 
primary 
school 693 7,89 7,89 7,89
unfinished 
primary 
school 337606,3 9,02 9,02 9,02
 
finished 
primary 
school 1694 19,29 19,29 27,18
finished 
primary 
school 760541,5 20,32 20,32 29,34
 
trade 
school 2661 30,30 30,30 57,49 trade school 1110100 29,66 29,66 58,99
 
technical 
school 1063 12,11 12,11 69,59
technical 
school 436996,9 11,67 11,67 70,67
 
secondary 
school 1196 13,62 13,62 83,21
secondary 
school 503772,4 13,46 13,46 84,13
 
college 
degree 773 8,80 8,80 92,02
college 
degree 306157,9 8,18 8,18 92,30
 
university 
degree 701 7,98 7,98 100
university 
degree 288020,1 7,69 7,69 100
 Total 8781 100 100  Total 3743195 100 100  
Total  8781 100    3743195 100   
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6.3.10 Unemployment 
The households were asked whether there were any unemployed in the family. 
Table 19 Unemployed in the household, 1999 and 2003 
1999 
Unweighted sample Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 10041 93,4 93,4 93,4 No 3573490 93,4 93,4 93,4 
  There are 
unemployed 713 6,6 6,6 100,0 
There are 
unemployed 252837 6,6 6,6 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
Unweighted sample Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 8273 94,21 94,21 94,21  3538971 94,54 94,54 94,54
 
There are 
unemployed 508 5,79 5,79 100  204224,4 5,46 5,46 100
 Total 8781 100 100   3743195 100 100  
Total  8781 100    3743195 100   
6.3.11 Loan repayment 
The households were asked whether there were any housing related loan/mortgage obligations 
connected to the flat they lived in.   
Table 20 Housing loan/mortgage (1999 and 2003) 
1999 
Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 
obligation 9528 88,6 88,6 88,6
,00 3391529 88,6 88,6 88,6 
  Yes, they 
have 
mortgage 
1226 11,4 11,4 100,0
1,00 
434798 11,4 11,4 100,0 
  Total 10754 100,0 100,0 Total 3826327 100,0 100,0   
 
2003 
 Unweighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Weighted 
sample Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 
obligation 7317 83,3 83,3 83,3
No 
obligation 3200305 85,5 85,5 85,5 
  Yes, they 
have 
mortgage 
1464 16,7 16,7 100,0
Loan 
repayment 
obligation 
542890 14,5 14,5 100,0 
  Total 8781 100,0 100,0 Total 3743195 100,0 100,0   
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 6.3.12 The model 
In the logit model we included the above mentioned variable with enter method. All variables 
were significant in the model. The variables in the model are the following (abbreviations 
stand for the following content): 
Logit model for 1999 
logistic reg var=hatra 
/categorical liskv ttipmszh ehtjovk5 rb_ert5 
/method enter  ttipmszh ehtjovk5 rb_ert5 tulonk laksz korev htagok gycsal eszul liskv mnelkn hittart 
/contrast (liskv)=indicator(1) 
/contrast (ttipmszh)=indicator(4) 
/contrast (ehtjovk5)=indicator(3) 
/contrast (rb_ert5)=indicator(3) 
/save pred 
/criteria pin(.05) pout(.10) Iterate(20) cut(.5). 
Logit model for 2003 
logistic reg var=hatra 
/categorical liskv ttipmszh ehtjovk5 rb_ert5 
/method enter  ttipmszh ehtjovk5 rb_ert5 tulonk laksz korev htagok gycsal eszul liskv mnelkn hittart 
/contrast (liskv)=indicator(1) 
/contrast (ttipmszh)=indicator(4) 
/contrast (ehtjovk5)=indicator(3) 
/contrast (rb_ert5)=indicator(3) 
/save pred 
/criteria pin(.05) pout(.10) Iterate(20) cut(.5). 
In the model we included all variables that showed any relevance according to the descriptive 
exploration of the phenomenon that is most related to the insecurity issue, namely arrears. 
Hence we reflected regional differences, income differences, equity differences, position on 
the labour market (unemployment and education), tenure type, age, household size and type, 
and loan repayment obligation. 
In the cases of all categorical variables that reflect financial position, we chose the average (or 
middle quintile) as contrast category. In the case of settlements, we chose the villages as 
contrast since the arrears in villages are the least likely. We proceeded in the same way with 
the level of education: those with a university degree are chosen as contrast. 
In order to see the similarities and possible changes between the results of the two surveys, we 
produced comparable variables. Hence it became visible that the structure of the risk for 
falling into arrears did not considerably change (besides one element, income), meaning that 
in both years the same aspects show the greatest chance for getting problems with paying the 
utility costs in the life of the households. It is also true, that the extent of probability changed 
through the explored period, meaning that the inequalities rose to some extent, nevertheless, 
some changes show to the opposite direction. (In the table: direction of change:↑=rise 
↓=lower ↑↑=great increase ↓↓=great decrease, or got above 1)  
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 Table 21 Change of Exp (B) 1999-2003 
  
1999 - 
2003 
B Value in 
2003   
1999 - 
2003 
B Value in 
2003 
Settlement type (contrast: villages) Municipal rental ↑ 2,007542 
Budapest  ↑↑ 4,362109 Multi-unit buildings ↓ 1,294882 
County Seats ↓ 2,035478 Age ↓ 0,976246 
Other towns ↓ 1,594887 Number of household members ↑ 1,179483 
Dependent children ↓ 0,90555 
 Income (contrast: middle income quintile Single parent families ↓ 1,629917 
Lowest income quintile ↑ 2,797556 
Second income quintile ↑ 1,519975  Education (contrast: unfinished primary school) 
Fourth income quintile ↑↑ 1,140724 Finished primary school ↑↑ 1,050195 
Highest income quintile ↑ 0,918541 Trade school ↑ 0,908 
Technical school ↑ 0,660034 
 Equity (contrast: middle quintile) Secondary school ↑ 0,497512 
Lowest unit value quintile ↑ 2,234363 College degree ↑ 0,484759 
Second unit value quintile ↑ 1,158902 University degree ↓ 0,248673 
Fourth unit value quintile 0,914691 Not significant   
Highest unit value quintile ↓ 0,405026 Unemployed ↓ 1,570265 
    Loan repayment ↓ 1,924366 
Constant 0,033376 0,030092     
Variable(s) entered on step 1: TTIPMSZH, EHTJOVK5, RB_ERT5, TULONK, LAKSZ, KOREV, HTAGOK, GYCSAL, ESZUL, 
LISKV, MNELKN, HITTART. 
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 Table 22 Variables in the Equation 1999, 2003 
1999 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
    B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1(a)  
TTIPMSZH   20994,715 3 ,000  
  Budapest TTIPMSZH(1) 1,225 ,009 17890,787 1 ,000 3,406
  County Seats TTIPMSZH(2) ,902 ,008 11995,706 1 ,000 2,464
  Other towns TTIPMSZH(3) ,794 ,006 15133,248 1 ,000 2,211
   EHTJOVK5   41610,650 4 ,000  
  Lowest income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(1) ,998 ,007 18975,985 1 ,000 2,714
  Second income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(2) ,190 ,008 617,081 1 ,000 1,209
  Fourth income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(3) -,558 ,009 3647,862 1 ,000 ,572
  Highest income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(4) -,370 ,010 1403,359 1 ,000 ,691
   RB_ERT5   14446,195 4 ,000  
  Lowest unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(1) ,669 ,007 8599,104 1 ,000 1,953
  Second unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(2) ,204 ,007 857,510 1 ,000 1,226
  Fourth unit value 
quintile 
RB_ERT5(3) -,089 ,008 139,417 1 ,000 ,915
  Highest unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(4) -,229 ,009 667,884 1 ,000 ,796
  Municipal rental TULONK ,660 ,007 8125,646 1 ,000 1,935
  Multi-unit 
buildings 
LAKSZ ,416 ,006 4165,900 1 ,000 1,516
  Age KOREV -,022 ,000 15131,420 1 ,000 ,978
  Number of 
household 
members 
HTAGOK 
,098 ,002 2407,080 1 ,000 1,103
  Dependent 
children 
GYCSAL -,095 ,006 228,706 1 ,000 ,910
  Single parent 
families 
ESZUL ,660 ,007 9468,132 1 ,000 1,935
   LISKV   13381,671 6 ,000  
  Finished 
primary school 
LISKV(1) 
-,038 ,008 23,738 1 ,000 ,962
  Trade school LISKV(2) -,538 ,009 3864,865 1 ,000 ,584
  Technical 
school 
LISKV(3) 
-,472 ,010 2277,157 1 ,000 ,624
  Secondary 
school 
LISKV(4) 
-,706 ,012 3689,601 1 ,000 ,494
  College degree LISKV(5) -1,011 ,014 4892,645 1 ,000 ,364
  University 
degree 
LISKV(6) -,932 ,015 3858,254 1 ,000 ,394
  Unemployed MNELKN ,640 ,006 10489,741 1 ,000 1,897
  Loan repayment HITTART ,669 ,006 13446,516 1 ,000 1,953
   Constant -3,400 ,019 33088,253 1 ,000 ,033
a  Variable(s) entered on step 1: TTIPMSZH, EHTJOVK5, RB_ERT5, TULONK, LAKSZ, KOREV, HTAGOK, 
GYCSAL, ESZUL, LISKV, MNELKN, HITTART. 
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 2003 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
    B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step  
1(a)  
TTIPMSZH   23786,347 3 ,000  
  Budapest TTIPMSZH(1) 1,473 ,010 22910,051 1 ,000 4,362
  County Seats TTIPMSZH(2) ,711 ,009 6166,306 1 ,000 2,035
  Other towns TTIPMSZH(3) ,467 ,006 5181,070 1 ,000 1,595
   EHTJOVK5   24359,451 4 ,000  
  Lowest income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(1) 1,029 ,008 15593,303 1 ,000 2,798
  Second income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(2) ,419 ,009 2384,402 1 ,000 1,520
  Fourth income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(3) ,132 ,009 205,493 1 ,000 1,141
  Highest income 
quintile 
EHTJOVK5(4) -,085 ,010 68,562 1 ,000 ,919
   RB_ERT5   26434,384 4 ,000  
  Lowest unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(1) ,804 ,008 10901,178 1 ,000 2,234
  Second unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(2) ,147 ,007 399,779 1 ,000 1,159
  Fourth unit value 
quintile27
RB_ERT5(3) ,011 ,008 2,280 1 ,131 1,011
  Highest unit 
value quintile 
RB_ERT5(4) -,904 ,011 7318,954 1 ,000 ,405
  Municipal rental TULONK ,697 ,008 7401,725 1 ,000 2,008
  Multi-unit 
buildings 
LAKSZ ,258 ,007 1366,140 1 ,000 1,295
  Age KOREV -,024 ,000 16830,095 1 ,000 ,976
  Number of 
household 
members 
HTAGOK 
,165 ,002 6257,727 1 ,000 1,179
  Dependent 
children 
GYCSAL -,099 ,007 215,880 1 ,000 ,906
  Single parent 
families 
ESZUL ,489 ,008 3670,574 1 ,000 1,630
   LISKV   13254,967 6 ,000  
  Finished 
primary school 
LISKV(1) 
,049 ,010 24,483 1 ,000 1,050
  Trade school LISKV(2) -,097 ,010 89,662 1 ,000 ,908
  Technical 
school 
LISKV(3) 
-,415 ,012 1173,385 1 ,000 ,660
  Secondary 
school 
LISKV(4) 
-,698 ,013 3110,138 1 ,000 ,498
  College degree LISKV(5) -,724 ,015 2379,234 1 ,000 ,485
  University 
degree 
LISKV(6) -1,392 ,020 4962,049 1 ,000 ,249
  Unemployed MNELKN ,451 ,007 3969,680 1 ,000 1,570
  Loan repayment HITTART ,655 ,006 13688,253 1 ,000 1,924
   Constant -3,504 ,021 27249,800 1 ,000 ,030
a  Variable(s) entered on step 1: TTIPMSZH, EHTJOVK5, RB_ERT5, TULONK, LAKSZ, KOREV, HTAGOK, 
GYCSAL, ESZUL, LISKV, MNELKN, HITTART. 
 
                                                
27 This variable is not significant in the model. 
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